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ABSTRACT
Shortly after the War of 1812, the U.S government attempted to construct a new military road
system connecting Nashville, Tennessee to strategic ports at New Orleans and Mobile. The road
was intended to grant faster military responses to British, Spanish, and Indian threats within
America’s southern frontier and to aid in the region’s settlement. The American government
directed iconic General Andrew Jackson to spearhead the road’s construction, believing the
construction would be rapid and the expenses minimal. However, the impenetrable thickets and
inundating swamps of the Mississippi Territory proved untamable, while shifting geo-political
dynamics mitigated the road’s necessity. Never used for massive troop deployment and with a
negligible impact on the settlement of Mississippi, the Jackson Military Road proved to be a
costly, futile endeavor.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 18, 1815, the United States and Britain signed the Treaty of Ghent,
officially ending the War of 1812. For the second time in America’s young history, the nation
successfully defended itself against the British. However, amongst national leaders, there was
still an uneasiness. America rested in a perilous situation. Alexander J. Dallas, acting Secretary
of War, believed America’s frontier regions to be particularly vulnerable. Britain stood as a
constant threat. It was the estimation of then-Secretary of State James Monroe that, had Britain
been victorious at the Battle of New Orleans, during peace negotiations British leaders would
have demanded all Gulf Coast lands be returned to Spain and would have possibly kept the port
of Mobile for themselves. Even with American victory at New Orleans, Britain still refused to
acknowledge America’s claims along the Gulf Coast, as well as the entirety of the Louisiana
Purchase. According to British officials, the land legally belonged to Spain. The British also
promised to protect their Creek and Seminole allies even after the war ended and even continued
to supply the Indians militarily.1 (In contrast, in the 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the first war
between Britain and the United States, nothing was mentioned concerning Indian rights or land
claims.)2
Tensions also remained high with Spain. Like Britain, Spain claimed the United States’
possession of the Louisiana Territory was illegal. Napoleon’s sale of the Louisiana Territory to
the United States had violated his own promise in the Treaty of Ildefonso to offer the land to

1

Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 298-301.
2
Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy: 1783-1812, (Norman: The University of Oklahoma
Press, 1967), 3.
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Spain first.3 Spain also disputed the border between the Mississippi Territory and its own
territory of West Florida. Disagreements on the boundary line between Spanish Florida and the
American southlands that eventually became the Mississippi Territory had been a source of
contention since the American Revolution ended. Though Spain allied with the United States
during the war, postwar agreements and the long, shared border between the two nations led to
constant distrust on both sides. As a result of the American Revolution, Britain had returned
Florida to Spanish control, and the thirty-first parallel was set as the boundary between Spanish
Florida and the American south. However, Spain refused to acknowledge the border, believing
its boundaries pushed further north.4
In 1806, former-Vice President Aaron Burr met with Jackson in Tennessee. Burr
convinced Jackson to have two boats constructed and officers contacted in, what Jackson
claimed, would be an attempt invade Mexico to take it from Spain. However, word reached
President Jefferson that Burr was possibly working with Spain, attempting to use this force to
wrestle New Orleans from the United States. One version of the theory holds that Burr was
attempting to create his own empire in the western frontier and that Spain supported this action
because Burr’s kingdom would provide a buffer between the United States and Spain’s colonies.
The story was sensational. A former Vice President had been lured by the dastardly Spanish to
commit treason. Jefferson ordered Burr’s arrest, and he was tried for treason. There was not
enough evidence to convict Burr, and historians still debate whether Burr was planning an
invasion of Mexico or actually working with Spain.5 Regardless of Burr’s true motives, the fact
that so many American citizens and politicians thought the revolt a possibility serves as proof of
just how terrifying Spain’s presence was for American settlers. In 1817, understanding and
3

Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 298.
Ibid, 47.
5
Robert V. Remini, The Life of Andrew Jackson, New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 55-60.
4
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playing to Southern fears over the supposed Spanish threat, Andrew Jackson asked Louisiana
politician Edward Livingston to, “Tell the people along the Gulf and my Neworleans friends that
I am wide awake to their security and defence – and only await the sound of war to be with
them.”6
Another concern was that peace needed to be negotiated or maintained with various
Indian nations.7 The Creek War ended with the Treaty of Fort Jackson, but afterwards, many
Creeks fled to Spanish Florida and refused to sign or acknowledge the agreement. Having
foregone the Treaty of Fort Jackson, these Creek tribes were considered to still be at war with the
United States and were now lurking in the foreign territory of Spanish Florida.8 Even as General
Jackson was organizing the defense of New Orleans, soldiers that he stationed throughout the
Mississippi Territory were still skirmishing with hostile Indians that were imprisoning and
scalping white settlers.9 After the war, Indian Agent Bernard Hawkins reported, “I find the
hostile Indians in small parties continue their plundering and murdering on the road.” Hawkins
later reported that hostile Indians were attacking from Spanish Florida and had “infested the road
. . . and attacked our wagons four times.”10
This intrigue led to a combination of fears for America. Along with the fears of direct
military threats from Britain and Spain, there was also the belief that the two nations were
actively fueling Native American attacks against white settlers.11 The belief had persisted since

6

Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 116.
Alexander James Dallas to Andrew Jackson, May 22, 1815, Manuscript/Mixed Material. Library of Congress, The
Andrew Jackson Papers, 1775-1874. (hereinafter cited as: LoC:AJP.)
8
Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 302.
9
An Affecting Narrative of the Captivity and Sufferings of Mrs. Mary Smith, (Providence, R.I.: Printed by L. Scott,
1815.)
10
Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the Making of the
American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 117-8.
11
Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads, 113.
7
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the American Revolution, when Britain had incited Indians to attack American settlements.12
Afterwards, Spain had done the same, promising the Creeks supplies and weapons if the Creeks
would declare war against the United States. Tecumseh, the Shawnee leader who desired a PanIndian alliance, even informed the Creeks of which Spanish ports they could visit to receive
weaponry.13 During the War of 1812, Jackson estimated that nearly 300 British had arrived in
Spanish Florida and, along with the Spanish, were arming the Creeks.14 British Captain Hugh
Pigot estimated that he was able to secure an alliance with over 3,000 Creek and Seminole
warriors who would launch raids into America’s southern frontier.15 Of particular concern for
the American government was Indian attacks on American post riders. During these attacks, the
Indians disrupted communications between disparate American posts and captured sensitive
information about American military strength and strategies, which they then passed along to the
Indians’ British collaborators.16 For Jackson, it became paramount to cleave the Indians from
their European allies. Thus, when Red Stick chiefs surrendered to Jackson during the Creek
War, he forced them to move their tribes north of his army so they could no longer be supplied
by the British or the Spanish. Before the peace negotiations of the Creek War, Jackson advised
that the U.S. government force the Creeks to concede all of their lands that bordered Spanish
Florida, so as to create a “bulwark against foreign invasion.”17
After the United States and Britain signed Treaty of Ghent, General Edmund Pendleton
Gaines, commander of Fort Jackson in modern-day Alabama and one of Jackson’s most trusted
soldiers, warned that some of the remaining Creeks were advised by British Lieutenant Colonel

12

Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 35.
Ibid, 187-8.
14
Ibid, 225.
15
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars, 90-1.
16
Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads, 97-8.
17
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars 80-1, 84.
13
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Edward Nicholls, who had remained stationed in Spanish Florida, “to kill any American they
find passing through their country, and not to suffer the lands lately ceded to the United States to
be taken possession of by us.”18 In 1815, Jackson warned Gaines that “if the Indians proceed to
any acts of hostility or opposition to the running of the line, it will be from the excitement of the
British officer [William] Hambly.”19
Jackson estimated that the Seminoles in Florida would not launch incursions against
American settlements “without great encouragement & support from some other power.”20 In
1818, during the First Seminole War, Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida and captured two
British subjects. Jackson claimed that he found evidence proving both subjects were supplying
Indian attacks across the border and ordered the two British men executed. Jackson stated that
the British subjects were “two unprincipled villains” who provided “false promises” designed to
“delude & excite a Indian tribe to all the horrid deeds of savage war.” 21
For Jackson, the event served as further proof that America’s southern frontier was in
dire need of protection. “So long as the Indians within the territory of Spain are exposed to the
delusions of false prophets,” he said, “and poison of foreign intrigue; so long as they can receive
ammunition, munitions of war &c from pretend Traders, or Spanish commandants it will be
impossible to restrain their outrages.”22
James Monroe believed New Orleans was particularly vulnerable. In a letter to Congress,
he warned,

18

Ibid, 97.
Andrew Jackson to Edmund Pendleton Gaines, September 30, 1815, The Papers of Andrew Jackson Digital
Edition. Edited by Daniel Feller. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2015-. (hereinafter cited as
PoAJ-Rotunda.)
20
Andrew Jackson to Alexander James Dallas, July 11, 1815, PoAJ-Rotunda.
21
Andrew Jackson to John Caldwell Calhoun, May 5, 1818, PoAJ-Rotunda.
22
Ibid.
19
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“It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion, by numerous
avenues leading to it, or more defenceless, by the thinness of the neighboring
population, or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent
acquisition, or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping invaders, from the immense
amount of produce deposited there, than the city of New Orleans. It is known,
also, that the seizure of no part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the
immediate interests of so many States, and of so many of our fellow-citizens,
comprising all that extensive territory, and numerous population, which are
connected with and dependent on the Mississippi, as the seizure of that city.”
Monroe continued his warning by stating that it was not solely a direct assault against New
Orleans that threatened the nation. It was also possible for an enemy to capture Mobile, the
Rigolets, the numerous islands near the coast, or lands north of the city. The latter would allow
enemies to cut off supplies to New Orleans.23
Two wars had been fought almost simultaneously – the Creek War and the War of 1812.
The first was a clear American victory and the second was at least celebrated as such. Yet, the
American government, military leaders, and thousands of settlers with designs on the southern
frontier all felt a sense of unease. More still needed to be done. To secure the region’s (and the
nation’s) safety, acting Secretary of War Dallas turned to America’s newest war hero – General
Andrew Jackson.
Not long after Americans received news of Jackson’s victorious outcome at the Battle of
New Orleans, they also received word that the War of 1812 had ended, and peace negotiations
were underway. Jackson’s name became synonymous with victory in the war.24 During the
march from Natchez to Nashville, Jackson’s soldiers bestowed upon him the name “Old
Hickory,” in part because he was willing to endure the same hardships they did.25 For his victory
at New Orleans, Congress passed a resolution honoring Jackson for “obtaining a most signal and
23

James Monroe, Re-examination of the Positions on Dauphin Island and Mobile Point for Fortification, March 26,
1822, American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 2, No. 223, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 368.
24
Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 294-5.
25
Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 179-180.
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complete victory over the enemy, with a disparity of loss on his part unexampled in military
annals,” and requested that President Madison cast a gold medal for Jackson.26
In particular, the South loved Andrew Jackson. Upon his return to Nashville following
the Creek War, “hundreds of people lined the streets to get a glimpse of the hero and to shout
their appreciation for his noble victory over the “savages.””27 Publishing in 1819, Gilbert J.
Hunt claimed, “The inhabitants of New-Orleans were greatly rejoiced, and carried [Jackson]
through the streets of the city above the rest; and the virgins of Columbia strewed his path with
roses.”28 In 1818, Jackson bid on a tract of land near present-day Muscle Shoals, Alabama.
Instead of anyone countering his bid, the crowd applauded and allowed Jackson to purchase the
land for far less than market value.29 In an 1820 letter to Jackson, Mississippi Governor George
Poindexter informed the general that, “You will live in our affections to the latest period of
time.”30 In 1822, when Mississippi decided to move its capital out of Washington city, the only
fitting namesake for the new capital was “Jackson.” As historian John Ray Skates noted,
“Jackson’s popularity among Mississippians was unshakable.”31 General Eleazar Wheelock
Ripley once noted that the South was Jackson’s “theatre of glory.”32
Fittingly, in the post-war period, the federal government chose Jackson to develop and
defend America’s southern frontier. In May of 1815, acting Secretary of War Dallas promoted
Jackson to commander of the Division of the South. The jurisdiction was large. According to

26

Resolutions reported by the Military Committee, expressive of the thanks of Congress to Major General Jackson,
and the troops under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct, in the defence of New Orleans.
(Washington, D.C.: Printed by Roger C. Weightman, 1815)
27
Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 221.
28
Gilbert J. Hunt, The Late War, Between the United States and Great Britain From June, 1812, to February, 1815.
Written in the Ancient Historical Style. (New York, self-published, 1819), 220.
29
Andrew Jackson to Isaac Shelby, November 24, 1818, LoC-AJP.
30
George Poindexter to Andrew Jackson, October 25, 1820, LoC-AJP.
31
John Ray Skates. Mississippi: A Bicentennial History (States and the Nation). (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1979), 83.
32
Eleazar Wheelock Ripley to John Caldwell Calhoun, December 30, 1817, LoC-AJP.
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Dallas, it included not only the Southern states, but most of the Northwest (modern-day lands
stretching from Indiana to the Mississippi river and the Missouri Territory) as well. Essentially,
Jackson was given jurisdiction over the majority of America’s frontier lands. Yet Dallas made
sure that the majority of Jackson’s attention needed to be centered on the Gulf of Mexico. Dallas
informed Jackson that “[t]he defence and security of New Orleans and Mobile are objects of
primary interest and importance. The recent events in Europe, and the conflicting claims of the
United States and Spain, to a part of the territory of West Florida, recommend every precaution,
that can be taken to protect our own rights.” 33
In 1822, President James Monroe reflected on the perilous situation along the Gulf of
Mexico. “The policy which induced Congress to decide on and provide for the defence of the
coast immediately after the war, was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch.
The vast body of men which it was found necessary to call into the field, through the whole
extent of our maritime frontier, and the number who perished by exposure, with the immense
expenditure of money and waste of property which followed, were to be traced in an eminent
degree to the defenceless condition of the coast. It was to mitigate these evils in future wars and
even for the higher purpose of preventing war itself, that the decision was formed to make the
coast, so far as might be practicable, impregnable. . .”34
By December of 1815, Jackson had assessed the situation on the southern frontier and
proposed a series of actions to create a viable defense. More batteries were needed to protect
Mobile, and fortifications at the entrance to Lake Pontchartrain needed to be completed. Also, a
better supply and transportation chain needed to be established. Existing depots in Georgia
needed to have relay points connecting to Mobile, on a route that would run the length of Spain’s
33

Alexander James Dallas to Andrew Jackson, May 22, 1815, LoC-AJP.
James Monroe, Re-examination of the Positions on Dauphin Island and Mobile Point for Fortification, March 26,
1822, American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 2, No. 223, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 368.
34
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Florida border. Finally, Jackson proposed the construction of a new road. If New Orleans were
to be truly protected from attack, the military needed the ability to swiftly send reinforcements
overland to the city. Jackson suggested that a road from division headquarters in Nashville could
be run to New Orleans at little expense and that the road would greatly shorten the current land
route (the Natchez Trace) by over 300 miles.35
Jackson knew the region well and understood the hardships involved in transporting
troops through the area. With the onset of the War of 1812 and the Creek War, General Jackson
was assigned to the Mississippi Territory (modern-day Mississippi and Alabama) and charged
with quelling Indian rebellions and defending the lands against potential British invasions.
Jackson’s first action in the War of 1812 was to raise 1,500 volunteer soldiers, organized into
two divisions, for what was expected to be a five-to-six-month campaign and assemble them in
Nashville. The troops were to be organized in Nashville by December 10, 1812. The challenges
of a difficult winter, procuring supplies, and organizing the volunteer army of the over-twothousand-men who arrived meant that the two divisions were not ready to march until January 7,
1813. The cavalry proceeded on land, but such was the terrible conditions of the Mississippi
Territory’s roads that the rest of the army decided to navigate the journey on boats. From
Nashville, the army loaded boats on the Cumberland River, which flowed into the Ohio River,
and eventually the Mississippi. Although the destination of Natchez, Mississippi, was only 500
miles away, the river journey from Nashville to Natchez coursed over 1,000 miles and lasted 39
days. It had been a long journey, and largely one of futility. By March, the War Department
changed its mind, believing Jackson would no longer be needed at New Orleans. The
Department dismissed Jackson and ordered him to muster out his forces on the spot – they would
be responsible for their own journeys home. Jackson was infuriated for many reasons but was
35

Andrew Jackson to William Harris Crawford, December 17, 1815, LoC-AJP.
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particularly irate that the government was essentially abandoning so many men 500 miles from
home. He refused to dismiss them and instead decided that he would personally pay to march
them back to Nashville. However, the journey to Nashville would not be as simple as the
journey from the city. There were no river routes. The entire march would have to take place
through the frontier lands of Mississippi and Tennessee. “They carefully followed me to the
field;” Jackson scoffed, “I shall carefully march them back to their homes.” On the journey, over
150 men fell sick, a third of which had to be transported by the only eleven wagons Jackson
could muster. Officers, including Jackson, offered their horses to the sick who could not fit on
the wagons. It took over a month to get the troops through the wilderness and back to
Nashville.36
Later in 1813, Jackson once again raised an army. This time, Jackson’s call to action was
directed against the Creeks in modern-day Alabama. A faction of the Creeks, known as the Red
Sticks, had assaulted Fort Mims (near Spanish-Pensacola) and slaughtered almost every white
person inside – a death toll of around 250 people. Jackson’s forces, along with three other
American armies, marched through what was then the eastern-Mississippi Territory, having to
cut roads as they marched. Rations quickly ran low as the expected supplies, including food and
medicine, never arrived. The situation became so dire that Jackson ordered his quartermaster
back to Nashville to find the missing supplies. He also ordered his troops to forage among
friendly Indians.37 Bad terrain enervated the supply chain, proving the difficulties of troop
transport in the Mississippi Territory. Overcoming seemingly endless bouts of dysentery and
recovering from a gunshot wound to his shoulder, Jackson also coordinated supply,
36

Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 170-180. The
primary reason Jackson’s land trip to Nashville was slightly faster than his water navigation to Natchez is because,
before he left Natchez for Nashville, he had been ordered to turn over most of his equipment and non-essential
supplies to General Wilkinson, who at the moment was stationed in New Orleans.
37
Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 189-191.
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communication, and troop-transport lines that stretched from Tennessee to southern Alabama
and New Orleans, Louisiana. The lack of reliable roads meant that reinforcements were often
delayed, supplies became exhausted, and volunteers revolted.38 When Jackson’s forces were not
engaged in combat or drilling, it was common for the general to have them repairing roads.39 In
a letter written during the Creek War, Jackson stated, “The irregularity of supplies has retarded
my progress very much.”40
Despite the difficulties, Jackson successfully led his men to victory. Much has been
written of Jackson’s ruthless assaults against Indian villages and of his strategic mastery at the
Battle of New Orleans. While his military actions garnered national fame and eventually placed
Jackson on a political pathway to the White House, his experience in the Mississippi Territory
also destined him to be a driving force in the Territory’s development – a development he hoped
to hasten with the construction of a reliable road.
Jackson, from a position of experience in trudging through the Mississippi wilderness,
could passionately defend his desire for a better roadway. During the War of 1812, the primary
land route Jackson’s military used to return to Tennessee was the Natchez Trace – a postal road
connecting Nashville, Tennessee, to Natchez, Mississippi. Even where the Trace and other roads
existed, they were often poorly maintained or too narrow to efficiently move a large army.
Fallen trees and overgrowth were common problems. In many areas, new roads had to be cut. In
the swamplands of Mississippi and Louisiana, soldiers sometimes marched in mosquito-and
snake-infested waters while building plank bridges to haul their heavy cannons.
Yet for all of Jackson’s desire and good intentions, the Military Road project never truly
served any military purpose. No European powers ever threatened Mobile or New Orleans after
38

Remini, Andrew Jackson: Volume One: The Course of American Empire, 1767-1821, 190-2, 223.
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars, 74-5.
40
Andrew Jackson to Leroy Pope, October 21, 1813, LoC-AJP.
39
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the War of 1812, thus there was never a requirement to march troops en masse from Nashville to
the Gulf of Mexico. Some historians, such as William A. Love, have posited that the Military
Road was used by settlers migrating from the eastern United States to Alabama and
Mississippi.41 However, census data shows that the number of settlers in counties through which
the Road ran grew at no significantly higher percentage than the number of settlers in other
counties in Mississippi and Alabama. The greatest population growths primarily occurred after
the Chickasaw and Choctaw land cessions. Those cessions were a result of the Indian Removal
Act of 1830, which occurred more than a decade after the Military Road’s completion and after it
had already fallen into disrepair. For instance, Adams County, bordering the Mississippi River,
grew from a population of 10,002 in 1810 to 12,076 in 1820 (after the Military Road’s
completion) and to 14,837 in 1830 (long after much of the wilderness had reclaimed the Military
Road). Thus, in both decades there was barely a discernable difference in population growth. In
Monroe county, near the Military Road’s transition from Alabama to Mississippi, the population
grew from 2,721 in 1820 to 3,861 by 1830. In this decade after the Military Road’s completion,
the population growth of just over 1,000 was drastically overshadowed by the growth the
following decade to 9,250. 42 That decade, from 1830 to 1840, began with the Indian Removal
Act forcing the Chickasaw from present-day Monroe County. Reports from the time prove the
road had already fallen into disrepair, thus it is likely other routes were more useful in settling
Mississippi.
At best, the Road’s construction provided jobs for surveyors, engineers, and soldiers.
However, the labor was intense and, at times, life-threatening. Supplies, particularly along the

41

William A. Love, “Andrew Jackson’s Military Road.” Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Volume
11, (1910), 415.
42
Richard L Forstall, Population of States and Counties of the United States: 1790 to 1990, U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Washington, DC, (1996): 88-91.
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Road’s stretch between Columbus, Mississippi and New Orleans, often ran low. Along with the
environmental and logistical challenges, the Road’s progress was also delayed by boundary
disputes with Indians, insubordination and ineptitude from some of Jackson’s subordinates, and
military actions in Spanish Florida. Also, despite Jackson’s claim that the Military Road could
be constructed for “very little expense,” Congress’s initial appropriation of five-thousand dollars
for the Road’s construction proved to be woefully insufficient. To make matters worse, despite
all of the hardships and expenses invested, the Military Road fell into despair almost
immediately upon completion. An examination into the Military Road’s construction and legacy
reveals the numerous environmental, physical, and political obstacles that delayed its
construction, as well as the reasons for the Military Road’s rapid decline.

13

THE UNTAMABLE FRONTIER

Almost since the nation’s conception, leaders such as George Washington held the view
that major roadways were key to keeping America’s frontier lands fully united with its more
settled regions along the Atlantic coast. In 1802, Congress passed the Ohio Statehood Enabling
Act, which included a statute designating five percent of the revenue from public land sales be
spent for road construction and maintenance. This provision was eventually included in all states
that achieved statehood, with the funds being split between each state’s internal roadways and
roads that connected states to one another.43 The principle applied to the 1806 U.S.
Congressional act, signed by President Thomas Jefferson, that established America’s first
federally funded national highway. Designed to pass through the Appalachian Mountains and
link America’s east coast to the Ohio River Valley, it became known as the Cumberland Road.44
When discussing the importance of federally funded roads, Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury,
Albert Gallatin, declared, “Good Roads and canals will shorten distances, facilitate commercial
and personal intercourse and unite, by a still more intimate community of interests, the most
remote quarters of the United States. No other single operation, within the power of government,
can more effectually tend to strengthen and perpetuate that Union which secures external
independence, domestic peace, and internal liberty.”45
Debate emerged over the constitutionality of the federal government building such roads.
James Madison was concerned about the constitutionality of the Cumberland Road, but
concluded that Congress could approve roads if they served a specific purpose. Over a decade
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later, in a letter to President James Monroe, former-President Madison noted, “As to the case of
post roads & military roads; instead of implying a general power to make roads, the
constitutionality of them must be tested by the bona fide object of the particular roads.” He then
bluntly stated, “The Post cannot travel, nor troops march without a road. If the necessary roads
cannot be found, they must of course be provided.” 46 With the precedent now set, future
legislators and presidents could now expand America’s transportation network and link the
frontier lands to the rest of the nation.
During the Creek War, Jackson demonstrated his belief in the importance of a dependable
transportation network to connect the frontier lands. Historian Angela Pulley Hudson said,
“Naturally, the unimpeded movement of troops across enemy lines is of concern during any
armed conflict. But given the nature of the ground to be covered in the Creek Nation and the
unreliable character of many of the roads, it was quickly deemed necessary to expand and
improve the old paths into roadways suitable for the transportation of ordnance and supplies.”47
As Jackson biographer Robert V. Remini noted, “Jackson planned to slice through the Creek
Nation, hewing a road through the wilderness as he marched, until he reached Mobile on the
coast. Such a march would provide a magnificent highway across the southwestern heartland for
future American settlers . . .”48 There was simply no individual with greater experience or
results in moving troops and conquering foes within America’s southern frontier than Andrew
Jackson.
On April 27, 1816, Congress approved the construction of Jackson’s road. Congress
allotted ten-thousand dollars to be split between the construction and maintenance of Jackson’s
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road, as well as another road from Georgia to Fort Stoddert (modern-day Alabama).49 Assuming
multiple bridges would have to be erected to complete Jackson’s road, Secretary of War William
Harris Crawford knew the amount was probably insufficient.50 Crawford’s financial concerns
were well-placed. The Mississippi Territory was notorious for its multiple rivers that continually
slowed travelers. Without bridges, travelers had to stop at each river to build rafts, use one of the
many ferry services that dotted the state, or wait and hope for the water levels to recede.51 Each
choice proved time-consuming. On top of the extra time it took to build bridges and causeways,
the necessary timber was expensive. When the federal government negotiated the right to cut
paths through Indian lands, the felled timber still belonged to the Indians. Thus, to use the
timber to construct bridges and causeways meant that the lumber had to be purchased from
whichever Indian nation owned the land.52 In the final report on the road, to address passage
over the Mississippi Territory’s various rivers and swamplands, Jackson’s road would consist of
over 3,000 feet of bridges and 25,000 feet of causeways.53
Congress’ initial construction budget of five thousand dollars also ignored recent
precedent. In an 1812 report on the Cumberland Road, then-Secretary of Treasury Albert
Gallatin stated that the first ten miles of the road had cost 75 and 80 thousand dollars.54 If it took
thousands of dollars to cut ten miles of one road, how could Congress expect Jackson to cut a
road connecting New Orleans to Nashville for a mere five-thousand dollars? Also, as substantial
as the financial costs were to construct such infrastructure, fears soon emerged that personnel
problems would also undermine the project.
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In the spring of 1816, Secretary Crawford transferred General Eleazar Wheelock Ripley
from the Northern Division of the army into Andrew Jackson’s Southern Division. Ripley had
court-martialed a subordinate over a personal dispute, which had upset his superiors. Based on
what he had heard of the trial, Jackson did not want Ripley in his division. In fact, Jackson
believed Ripley’s dishonorable conduct served as grounds for his dismissal from the army.55
Jackson even claimed that news of Riley’s transfer threatened the morale of Jackson’s officers,
stating, “I can only say that the officers live in the most perfect Harmony with each other in my
Division and I should be sorry that a transfer should be made that would interrupt this good
understanding.”56 Despite Jackson’s objections, Ripley was transferred to his command and part
of his duties eventually included construction of Jackson’s Military Road. As time passed,
Jackson would become convinced that Ripley’s conduct did more to slow the Road’s
construction than help it.
Secretary of War Crawford, who Jackson came to regard as a “pettifogging politician,”
was also taking other actions that upset Jackson.57 General John Coffee was at work surveying
the boundary of a recent annexation of Creek land. Coffee had served as the head of Jackson’s
cavalry during the Creek Wars, commanding over one-thousand men, and was one of Jackson’s
most-trusted friends.58 The line Coffee was running, however, was being disputed by other
Indian nations. Jackson assured Coffee that “the Choctaws have no claim East of the Tombigby
[sic].”59 Though Jackson had already participated and led many treaty negotiations with various
Indian groups, he believed all of the negotiations to be foolish and unnecessary. Jackson

55

Andrew Jackson to William Harris Crawford, April 24, 1816, PoAJ-Rotunda.
Ibid.
57
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars, 105.
58
Mike Bunn and Clay Williams, Frontier in Flames: The Creek War and the Mississippi Territory, The Journal of
Mississippi History, Summer 2012, 124.
59
Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, February 2, 1816, PoAJ-Rotunda.
56

17

believed the Indians were subjects of the United States and could be removed at the
government’s insistence.60 Jackson also sent a letter to a Chickasaw leader George Colbert
warning him that the Chickasaws had no claim to the land in question and that “any opposition to
Genl [sic] Coffee will meet with prompt and immediate punishment. The President of the United
States loves his red children, & will do justice to them; but he will punish his red children when
they attempt by force to do wrong.”61 To add visible credibility to his threat, Jackson readied
twenty-five mounted gunmen to guard Coffee’s party.62 Despite Jackson’s confidence and
aggressiveness, Secretary Crawford ordered Coffee to stop the survey until negotiations could be
completed with Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indian nations. 63 Trying to ease Jackson’s
worries, Crawford assured him that “the difficulty with the Cherokees will not interfere with the
military road from Tennessee to the gulf of Florida [sic], as they propose to admit of any roads
which the President shall direct to be opened.”64 Jackson, however, believed the government
would not allow him to continue construction until the negotiations were completed. He was
also convinced that Crawford was simply stalling the development of the Mississippi Territory
so as to stop emigration from Georgia (Crawford’s home state). Jackson claimed that Crawford,
“wishes to prevent the population of Georgia to be reduced by the emigration to this new
country. . .”65 This was a fear shared by other southern states on the eastern coast. For instance,
in 1809, a single wagon train of nearly 1,000 individuals journeyed from South Carolina to the
southern portion of the Mississippi Territory.66 Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas all feared
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“Mississippi Fever” depopulating their states.67 So many South Carolinians moved to Marion
County, Mississippi, that the county’s largest city was named “Columbia.” In 1817, James K.
Paulding, traveling through the southern United States, “witnessing the magnitude of this mighty
wave which knows no retrograde motion, but rolls over the land, never to recoil again.”68 Also,
Jackson believed Crawford’s actions were also a personal attack, stating, “I know [Crawford] is
my enemy” and “[Crawford] oposes [the settlement of the Mississippi Territory] because I have
recommended it”69 However, Crawford’s primary complaint concerning immigration to the
Mississippi Territory stemmed from illegal squatter settlements – settlers who did not pay the
federal government for the lands they lived upon. He claimed these squatters were “the very
worst part of our citizens.”70
Entering the summer of 1816, confident that the negotiations with the Indians would end
favorably and with Crawford’s assurance that the road could be constructed through Creek lands
regardless, Jackson was ready to start making progress on his road. He wanted a surveyor to run
an experimental line for the Military Road, but knew the prospect of sending a surveyor into
such wilderness would prove expensive. In June of 1816, he inquired of Secretary Crawford
whether the loan department would authorize such an expenditure, or whether he would have to
wait on the arrival of the army’s own topographic engineers.71 John Gordon, another of
Jackson’s friends and a fellow veteran of the War of 1812, assessed the situation himself. He
informed Jackson that he believed the survey of the road would require at minimum seven men:
a surveyor, two men to work the chains, a marker, someone to tend to the packhorses, a camp
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keeper, and an explorer. If at all possible, he told Jackson that he would feel more comfortable if
the budget could allow for a few more men. Aside from manpower, Gordon also stated that the
survey would require multiple packhorses, cooking utensils, and surveying tools.72
Leading into the fall season, Secretary Crawford informed Jackson that troops would
likely be used for the road’s construction, as opposed to hiring civilian laborers. This was a
common practice in the era. During the same time soldiers were constructing Jackson’s Military
Road, the government was also building the Federal Road from Georgia to Louisiana. Georgia
Governor David B. Mitchell informed Secretary of War Calhoun that military labor would be
necessary to construct the Federal Road because the settlers near the road’s path were too busy
clearing land for their plantations and the government could offer them no reasonable
compensation.73 Therefore, military and government leaders deemed military labor to be more
affordable, and also a suitable method to prevent idleness amongst the troops.74 Jackson agreed
with the sentiment, having previously noted that “indolence [of the troops] creates disquiet.”75
During the Jefferson administration, Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins had proposed using paid
Indian labor to build the roads through their territory, but Jefferson and others struck down the
idea.76 It would have to be American labor and the federal government believed military labor
would be the most efficient.
In August, interim Secretary of War George Graham informed Jackson that Jackson
would be allowed to appoint the surveyor of his choice.77 (Secretary Crawford had been
reappointed as Secretary of the Treasury, and President Madison had yet to choose a permanent
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replacement). Jackson decided to use two men to survey his road. One would survey the
northern portion, and one would survey the southern portion. Jackson selected Captain Hugh
Young to survey the road’s southern (and most difficult) portion, and William Orlando Butler, a
man who served under Jackson during the Battle of New Orleans, to survey the road’s northern
section.
Just traveling through the Mississippi Territory presented numerous environmental
challenges. The 1820 Emigrant’s Directory, describing the geographical realities of Mississippi,
stated that a northern trip from the Pearl or Pascagoula Rivers would lead a traveler “through
immense forests of the long-leaved pine, interspersed with cypress swamps and open prairies; the
surface generally level, but occasionally swelling into hills of moderate elevation, and receding
into vast prairies, inundated marshes, and pestilential swamps.”78 Andrew Ellicott, surveyor of
the Mississippi Territory-Spanish Florida border that was agreed upon in the 1795 Treaty of San
Lorenzo (Pickney’s Treaty), noted the rough terrain. At the beginning of his survey, he noted,
“The first twenty miles of country over which the line passed, is perhaps as fertile as any in the
United States; and at the same time the most impenetrable, and could only be explored by using
the cane knife and hatchet. The whole face of the country being covered with strong canes,
which stood almost as close together as hemp stalks, and generally from twenty to thirty-five feet
high, and matted together by various species of vines, that connected them with the boughs of the
lofty timber, which was very abundant. The hills are numerous, short and steep: from those
untoward circumstances, we were scarcely ever able to open one-fourth of a mile per day, and
frequently much less.” Later in his journal, Ellicot lamented that, “The swamps were numerous,
and many of them so deep, that we had to go considerably out of our way either to cross, or go
78
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round them, and others we had to causeway.” And it was not just individually traveling through
the terrain that was difficult, but also having to transport the proper equipment and supplies. To
carry his survey equipment and supplies, Ellicott’s party had to cut roads along the way. In one
such instance, Ellicott noted that “Our instruments, baggage, &cc. were first carted from the
Bayou Tunica, to Alston's Lake, into which I had previously taken through the swamp two light
skiffs: the articles were then taken by water, up the lake to the point where our road from the hill
struck it, and from thence packed on horses to our encampment. The country was so broken, and
covered from the tops to the bottoms of the hills, with such high, strong cane, (arundo gigantea,)
and a variety of lofty timber, that a road from the Bayou Tunica, to our camp, could not be made
by our number of hands, in less than a month passable for pack-horses.”79
As would be a common case with the men who constructed Jackson’s Road, Ellicott had
numerous logistical issues in securing supplies. In one instance, he connected with laborers
assigned to resupply his party, only to learn the resources “could not possibly be brought up, till
a large quantity of timber was removed, and channels cut through two rafts or floating bridges,
which extended from one side to the other; and those rafts or bridges, being in the swamp, the
articles could not be carried round them.” As the days continued, so did the hazards. Ellicott
noted that the difficulties were “so great, owing to the swamps and morasses which lay-in the
way, and were daily filling with water” that he paused the survey and headed back for New
Orleans. He and his team had run out of clothing and their supplies still had not reached them. It
was determined that upon his return to the survey, it would be easier and more expedient to have
his heavier supplies sailed through the Gulf of Mexico and transported up the Mississippi
Territory’s various rivers to meet with his survey group.

79

Andrew Ellicott, The Journal of Andrew Ellicott, (Philadelphia: William Fry, 1814), 181-186, 209.

22

Yet the Mississippi wilderness made even this compromise difficult, as Ellicott noticed
that many of the rivers were “full of logs and lodged trees; which are at present very injurious to
its navigation.” Also, one of his supply boats, a schooner, was later stolen by Indians.80 In 1815,
traveler William Richardson journeyed by land from Boston to New Orleans. While his route
from Boston to Nashville was largely uneventful, his journey through the wilderness of Alabama
and Mississippi was perilous. The vast distances between settlements meant that his supplies
often ran low and that he often slept on the bare ground. The lack of bridges meant he often had
to wait days to cross rivers and creeks – while hoping for their levels to recede. On March 28, he
stated, “I have this day swam my horse five times, bridged one creek, forded several other bad
ones besides the swamp we had to wade through.” This was just one day. If spending hours and
days wading through the numerous Mississippi swamps were not enough to worry the traveler,
the graves of previous travelers were. On the following day, March 29, he, “passed several
graves where travelers who had died on the road were buried.”81 The surveyors assigned to
Jackson’s Military Road faced similar tribulations.
Butler started his survey first, but quickly fell behind schedule. On September 6, he
reported to Jackson the reasons for his delay, as well as the early progress on the road. Butler’s
initial reports demonstrate the numerous settlements present at the road’s beginning stages.
Butler reported the line running near farms and plantations, such as a portion “passing through
the east corner of John Childris’s farm.” Butler had run a line from Columbia, Tennessee, to the
Tennessee River in the Mississippi Territory. One of the reasons for his delay, he informed
Jackson, was that he had deviated from some of the lands initially thought fit for the road. Some
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places were too rocky, others too narrow. He assured Jackson that upon studying the area, the
minor changes he made were necessary. 82
The inconveniences endured by Butler’s team were relatively mundane to the trials the
southern survey team faced. In November of 1816, Captain Hugh Young, Assistant
Topographical Engineer, led seven men south from Nashville.83 Under orders from Andrew
Jackson to survey the experimental line of the Military Road’s southern portion, the crew’s
planned journey passed through Chickasaw and Choctaw territory in route to New Orleans. The
southern portion of the line represented some of the least understood portions of the Mississippi
Territory. Young’s party knew their venture would lead them ever-farther from the established
settlements of central Tennessee and into the relatively primitive woodlands of the central
Mississippi Territory. However, any aspirations the crew had of at least beginning the journey
effortlessly were quickly dashed. The rainy winter transformed the Tennessee roads into little
more than muddy quagmires. Already delayed by what Young described as the worst roads and
weather he had ever experienced, sickness and blistered feet began plaguing the party. From the
journey’s onset, Young complained his crew lacked the manpower to efficiently complete their
mission. Now, the winter’s onslaught left one crewman too sick to continue. Young’s party had
barely reached the Tennessee border and was already lacking for manpower. Aside from the
elements, supply shortages were also causing delays. The flour Young expected to procure in
Columbia, Tennessee was unavailable. He tried to wait for a shipment of wheat that would have
to be ground into flour, but even that prospect fell through. With a little luck, Young finally
procured enough flour to continue the mission, but supply shortages plagued the team’s entire
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journey.84 As Young’s party began heading into Chickasaw territory (modern-day north
Mississippi and northwest Alabama), the poor conditions the crew faced in this first leg of their
journey served simply as a hard initiation of the perils they would face.
On December 4, Captain Young penned Jackson with the unfortunate news that, despite
his efforts, he was unable to find a suitable replacement to join his team. If he lost another
member, Young warned, the expedition’s completion might prove impossible.85 A few weeks
later, on December 22, Young informed Jackson he had recently surveyed twenty-three miles of
land near the Tombigbee River – and it was a toilsome venture. Swamps and thickets comprised
fully two-thirds of the land, with the last third consisting of large pine and oak woodlands
enveloped in vines and briars. Despite their struggles, Young’s team had crossed the Tombigbee
River (essentially the dividing line between present-day Mississippi and Alabama). The survey
would continue, he promised Jackson, but more delays were to be expected. 86
Despite learning of Young’s tribulations, Jackson began the year 1817 in celebration. On
January 8, in Nashville – his home and headquarters – an opulent ball replete with thunderous
cannon fire marked the two-year-anniversary of his infamous victory at the Battle of New
Orleans.87 Perhaps fittingly on such an anniversary, Jackson’s southern survey team spent the
beginning of the year slogging through the same awful Mississippi terrain Jackson had
surmounted two-years prior. Young led the team through thickets and swamps that seemed just
as tenacious in demoralizing his party, as he was in blazing this new trail. So dense were the
thickets that his party often became separated and sometimes even had trouble finding their way
back to camp. Procuring horses was difficult – as was keeping them. Some horses went missing
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(Indian thieves were suspected), while others drowned in the rivers and swamplands. Young
lamented the fast-rising swamp waters that sometimes rose so quickly that the crew became cutoff from land and were forced to swim to safety. Along with nature’s fury, Young’s team also
contended with a continuing lack of supplies. Once after running out of meat, the entire survey
halted for three days while a team was sent away to procure and butcher hogs. Flour and corn
meal also ran dangerously low. Every time supplies ran low or horses went missing, the survey
had to be delayed. In one instance, Young and a crew member walked one-hundred and fifty
miles in three days trying to procure horses – all in vain.88 The struggles that Young’s crew
faced demonstrated the desperate need for roads to be constructed, while at the same time
revealing the sheer difficulty in such tasks. The Mississippi Territory would not easily yield its
wilderness.
On March 4, 1817, James Monroe ascended to the office of the presidency. On the same
date, Jackson penned President Monroe a long report disclosing the many potential crises
afflicting the Southern District, while reminding the new President that his foremost duty was to
secure the nation’s safety. New Orleans and Mobile stood defenseless; old fortifications had
been left to ruin, and the promised new ones had yet to be constructed. Jackson, assuring
Monroe that the dire situations necessitated the letter’s abrasiveness, proposed a bevy of
remedies. The forts promised by the previous administration had to be constructed, and
settlement into the Mississippi Territory needed to be encouraged.
Thus far, Congress feared opening up too much Mississippi land would decrease its
value, but Jackson contended such an economic argument would prove invalid if the lands were
swept away by some foreign power. Instead, settlers would serve as defenders in the militia,
create goods to supply military units, and build infrastructure that would hasten military
88
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movements.89 In an 1816 letter to interim Secretary of War George Graham, Jackson pleaded
that, “nothing can promote the welfare of the United States, and particularly the southwestern
frontier so much as bringing into market, at an early date, the whole of this fertile country.”90
Native Americans understand the dangers in white settlement. Through a treaty negotiated with
the federal government, the Creeks in the southern Mississippi Territory had agreed to a fourfoot-wide postal road connecting Georgia to Fort Stoddard. However, when settlers began
widening the road for wagons, the Creeks posted the following message on a sign: "For the
benefit of Travelers we state, that it now is, and has been the policy of the Creek Indians to
prevent Carriages of any kind from passing through their Territory."91 Historian Reginald
Horsman noted that the building of roads and settlements into America’s frontier lands increased
the rapidity of Native American cessions, expanding America’s territory. Conflicts inevitably
arose between settlers and Indians, but eventually militias and the U.S. government intervened
and persuaded the Indians to cede their land.92 The conquest on Indian lands was a brutal and
callous reality, but reality none the less. In a letter to James Monroe, Jackson assured the
president that “once the defence of the frontier is carried into effect, by completing those
fortifications, that have and may be selected . . . then we will have peace, for then we will be
prepared for war – every man having a gun in his hand, all Europe combined cannot hurt us –
Then all the world will be anxious to be at peace with us – because all will see we wish peace
with all – but are prepared for defence against those (all) who may attempt, to infringe on our
national rights.”93
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Jackson assured President Monroe that he was already directing actions to bolster the
southern frontier. Jackson informed Monroe that he expected Captain Young to complete the
experimental line and return to Nashville within the month. Jackson also announced to Monroe
that he had selected a site (near modern-day Muscle Shoals and Florence, Alabama) along the
Tennessee River upon which to build a foundry and an armory. The site was almost too good to
be true. Its location on the Tennessee River meant supplies and communications could more
quickly be sent to towns and forts along the Mississippi River. The location could also be used
to quickly reach Mobile by land or river, should the U.S. navy be cut off from the Gulf of
Mexico. Nearby, there was plenty of ore for the foundry, numerous coal deposits, and an
abundance of trees to construct forts, roads, and bridges. Jackson, perhaps with a bit of
embellishment to ensure Monroe’s attention, deemed it “the most advantageous site in America”
and noted that the Military Road would run through this crucial position.94
On March 17, Congress promoted Jackson’s friend, John Coffee, to Surveyor General of
the northern Mississippi Territory.95 Coffee, previously engaged in surveying Indian land
concessions in the region, knew the area well. Coffee, along with Edward Pendleton Gaines, had
already constructed a much smaller road in the northern Mississippi Territory. Now known as
Gaines Trace, the road created a land-based connection between the Tennessee River (near
Muscle Shoals) and the Tombigbee River (near Cotton Gin Port in modern-day Monroe
County).96 The road had been swiftly constructed in 1816, partially owing its rapid completion
to the favorable terrain upon which it was built. Jackson’s instructions were clear – in order to
rapidly settle the region, Coffee’s office was to immediately begin surveying townships in the
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region between the Tennessee border and the Tennessee River (modern-day northern
Alabama).97 Jackson’s road would be constructed along the most favorable portion of Coffee’s
jurisdiction.
By April, Captain Young had completed his trek to the southern end of the line and began
preparing an initial report. The report was hopeful but ominous. “With regard to the physical
character of the country,” Young warned, “it presents many obstructions, in the way of making a
good road – much labour will be necessary, and many wide deviations from the guide line.” Yet,
Young concluded that despite the obstacles, “with reasonable expectations of time and work,
[constructing the road] is by no means impracticable.” It was Young’s estimation that the
construction of the road between Madisonville, Louisiana and Noxubee, Mississippi would be
the least difficult section of the Military Road’s southern portion. This owed to the region’s
level terrain. The most pressing concern in the section, according to Young, was near the Leaf
River, where “we have to cross three large creeks of the Leaf, two of which, are extremely
difficult.” However, it was the land between Noxubee and the Tombigbee River that troubled
Young the most. The terrain was “almost mountainous” with “singular alterations of steep and
difficult ridges.” Young hoped that “the broken ground can be either got over or avoided, by a
little searching.” Young summarized terrain’s difficulties, stating “The difficulties in our way,
arise from these three causes – the number of streams crossed – and the width and number of the
swamps. The evils arising from these impediments, will be two, increase of expense and
lengthening the road . . . so that in overcoming all obstruction, the two considerations must be,
conjointly, kept in mind.” Young informed Jackson that he would return to Nashville to
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personally discuss the road and Young’s future duties in regards to it. 98 Knowing the initial
survey line was complete, however, was all the news Jackson needed to take action.
By May, Andrew Jackson determined that he would not wait for Captain Young’s return
and ordered road-building operations to commence immediately. One company from Fort
Hampton (located along Alabama’s Elk River near the Tennessee border and almost directly
south of Jackson’s Nashville headquarters) would begin construction until more troops could be
sent. Jackson expected that two additional companies would soon be added on the northern
route. He issued the orders knowing that the engineers lacked quadrants and sextants – vital
tools for accurate surveys. He also ordered General Eleazar Ripley to lead two companies to link
with Captain Young and immediately begin construction of the road’s southern portion. The
plan was ambitious. Jackson ordered the road to be thirty feet wide, bridges to be erected across
every stream, and causeways built through the swamplands. The causeways were to be built
above the high water marks and to be twenty feet wide.99 For comparison, in 1807, the U.S. Post
Office accepted bids for improving the Natchez Trace (also beginning in Nashville, Tennessee
and passing through Alabama and Mississippi in a more westward direction) that called for the
road to be twelve feet wide.100 The Natchez Trace itself was wider than many other post roads
that traversed through Indian territories, as much of the negotiations settled on limiting the road
widths from four to six feet – Indians wanted the paths to be impassable for settlers’ wagons.101
Most of the existing Indian pathways were no wider than two feet, just large enough for a horse
to pass through.102 In an 1801 meeting with the Choctaw at Fort Adams, the chiefs informed
Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins and the other commissioners that they would accept travelers
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and merchants passing through agreed upon roadways, but they were adamant that no white
settlers were allowed.103 Military roads served a different purpose than post roads, however, as
they needed to allow the passage of supply wagons and heavy artillery. Therefore, width was
important, but not the only factor. In 1803, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn ordered that
military roads should “not [exceed] sixteen feet in width and not more than eight feet of the
sixteen to be cut close to the ground, and smoothed for passengers . . . the great object is to have
a comfortable road for horses and foot passengers, and instead of the expense of cutting a wide
road, it is more important that the swamps and streams should be causewayed and bridged.”104
Jackson wanted his road almost twice as wide as Dearborn had advised a decade earlier. By the
time the Military Road was complete, Jackson’s ambition looked more like foolhardiness.
By July 1817, Surveyor-General John Coffee had already surveyed one-hundred
townships along the Tennessee River in the Mississippi Territory.105 For Jackson, the news was
delightful. Jackson had no doubt of the area’s benefits and assured Coffee that the site Jackson
chose for the military depot would “become the Nashville of the Tennessee” River.106
News from the southern portion of the Military Road was, initially, not as promising. In
June, Hugh Young reported that about 90 men from Ripley’s forces had arrived in Madisonville
to begin preparations for cutting their portion of the road. Their preparations consisted of
acquiring tools and “waiting the purchase of necessary teams for transporting their baggage and
provisions.” According to Young, Ripley’s men would probably would not be ready to cut the
road until late in the month.107
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One month later, Young wrote again to Jackson. He had been held up in leaving
Madisonville due to difficulties in procuring horses. However, on this final survey, he had found
a way to make the road’s distance shorter, but it meant crossing through more hilly terrain. This
improved line had moved about four miles from his original survey and now ran nearly parallel
to a Choctaw path he stumbled across. At this point, Young also encountered “the most
formidable difficulty in my route” – the waters and land around the Black Creek. This section
included four creeks, Bogue Falaya, the East Bogue Falaya, Bogue Loosa, and Pushmitapa,
which would require the construction of bridges and three rivers in which troops would have to
rely on ferries. In proceeding with the survey past this section, Young estimated he would
advance eight miles per day and that he would reach the Tennessee River in no more than fifty
days. Young also repeated his desire to be reassigned to the road cutting team once his final
survey had been completed. The appointment, he advised Jackson, would allow him a chance to
more slowly and thoroughly direct the line’s final position.108
To help with the Military Road’s funding, on March 27, 1818, Congress approved
another five-thousand dollars to be used for the road’s construction and maintenance.109 When
Jackson initially proposed the road, he had stated that it could be built at “little expense.”
Whether Jackson was naïve and underestimated the cost or purposely underestimated the money
needed in order to get approval, the road’s expense was growing. The extra funds were
welcomed, but further delays in the southern district threatened to quickly deplete the resources.
When Eleazar Ripley took command in the southern region, he first set about to assess
the lands he commanded and determined the region was invaluable to the nation’s present and
future. Writing to Secretary of War Calhoun, Ripley stated, “The welfare and security of the
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country on the Gulf of Mexico is indispensably connected with the interest of the states and
territories beyond [the] mountains. It is the key to the region which a beneficent providence has
formed . . . So magnificent and vast as to be capable of the highest improvements.”110 Of special
note was the region’s role in America’s commerce. “The recent war has convinced us how
precious in the view of the nation that portion of the country, thro’ which our western commerce
must travel in its passage to and from the Gulf,” Ripley state, “and the efforts made to dispossess
us of it are equally instinctive in showing the importance attached to it by other nations.” Ripley
connected his views on the region’s importance to his work on the military road. “When
completed,” he said, “besides effectually opening the commercial intercourse between the
western states . . . It will essentially contribute to the strength of the lower country by affording
an avenue along which the military array of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi can in ease of
necessity precipitate itself to the defense of New Orleans. The road will require time for
completion, but it is of incalculable importance to the interests of the whole western country.” In
view of these challenges and the road’s importance, however, Ripley felt as though the odds
were stacked against him.
The most pressing issue was that he was severely understaffed. He reported to Robert
Butler that too many of his subordinate officers were absent due to sickness and furloughs. The
issue had become so bad that he was having to deny furloughs to his remaining staff.111 On the
same day, in a letter to Jackson, Ripley also sent a request to improve the amount and condition
of his soldiers’ barracks, as well as an increase in his department’s recruiting capabilities,
especially in northern states. Without more soldiers, Ripley not only feared being unable to
complete the Military Road, but he also feared his current forces would be insufficient to repel
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an enemy invasion.112 Ripley also shared his disappointing view of this command with the
Secretary of War. “The present state of things in this department is far from affording the
requisite military organization. There are now arranged to it two regiments of infantry and two
battalions of artillery; these however are not to their complement.” Besides being understaffed,
the infrastructure of the region was also in a dilapidated state. The command’s magazines and
arsenals were “deplorable.” The barracks at New Orleans were “entirely useless” and “Fort St.
Philips, Pass Christian, Natichitoches, Mobile, Fort St. John, and Petitite Coquille . . . are little
better than hovels. They cannot even shelter from storms and tempests.” Ripley told the
Secretary, “I trust the period has arrived when a just government will no longer tolerate such a
state of things.”113
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ACROSS THE RIVERS AND INTO THE TREES

Despite Ripley’s misgivings about the state of his command, the Military Road’s
construction needed to proceed in earnest. The most daunting tasks would include constructing
the numerous causeways and bridges needed to cross a variety of rivers, creeks, and swamps.
Each bridge was assigned unimaginative, but efficient names denoting their numerical order.
“Bridge No. 1” was the first bridge, followed by “Bridge No. 2” and so on. To construct the
road and bridges, workers first had to clear trees, brush, briars, and other vegetation. Workers
cut the trees down as close to ground level as possible. The center path, wide enough for a
wagon, had to have all stumps removed to make travel safe for horses. After clearing the timber
from the pathway, workers used the logs as construction materials for the bridges and causeways.
Workers had to chop all limbs from the trees and mill the logs in the specific manner each bridge
and causeway called for.
From the Military Road’s southern terminus in Madisonville, Louisiana, it took a
northern course to Covington, Louisiana. The distance between the two towns is a mere seven
miles, but at Covington the troops already needed to construct their first bridge. The bridge
needed to traverse the Bogue Falaya, also referred to simply as the Falaya River, for a distance of
153 feet. To span such a distance, the bridge required four trestles made up of two hewn support
posts.114 The posts were eighteen inches by sixteen inches and of varying lengths depending on
the depth of the river. These posts were mortised and riveted into a cap stone of the same
dimension and measured twenty-four-feet long. There were abutments erected on both
shorelines and diagonal support poles, fastened with iron bolts, were run from each abutment and
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capstone into the river bottom.115 To span the abutments and capstones, workers placed fortyfoot-long hewn boards that measured twenty inches square. On top of these boards, workers ran
two-and-one-half-inch think flooring planks that were fastened with nails. Workers then ran
four-foot-tall railings across the length of the bridge, containing two parallel lengths of railings
between the top rail and the floor planks. After completing the construction, workers tarred the
bridge in an attempt to prevent weathering. Bridge No. 1, and all bridges between Madisonville
and the Choctaw boundary line, were constructed primarily of pine timber. However, across the
Military Road’s entire stretch of bridges and causeways, multiple types of timber were used,
based on what was available to the workers. Along with pine logs, oak, elm, and hickory were
also used frequently.116 Because the water levels often changed, workers measured the height of
the bridges from the floor planks to the riverbed. For Bridge No. 1, this height was seventeen
feet, but the numbers varied between seven and twenty-two feet. (Figure 1).
Four miles past the first bridge, troops erected Bridge No. 2 to cross the Little Fayala
River, also known as Saw Mill Creek. The bridge spanned 111 feet, but only had one support
frame between its two abutments. Troops employed a similar construction method, with the
primary difference being extra logs used on one shoreline to dissipate the angle created by the
four-foot height difference between the northern and southern shores.
It was only after ten more miles that workers were forced to erect a third bridge across
Black Bayou in the Bogue Chitto Swamp. Soldiers ran the bridge 139 feet and constructed it
much like the first two bridges, but at an even steeper angle because of the steep differences in
the river’s banks. (Figure 2).
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Only one-half mile later, workers erected Bridge No. 4. By the time workers erected
Bridge No. 6, they had only traveled thirty-two miles from Madisonville and constructed 569
feet of bridges. It is also at this point that workers began to employ slightly less secure
construction methods and also began foregoing important maintenance measures. For Bridge
No. 7, the soldiers used wooden pins, rather than iron bolts as fasteners. The workers did not
even tar Bridge No. 8, making it more susceptible to weathering. Bridge No. 9 did not have any
extra railings between its top rail and its floor planks. Its flooring was only one-inch-square.
(Figure 3). Bridge No. 10’s joists were only twelve inches square, however, unlike the previous
nine bridges, workers placed diagonal supports within each set of joists.117
Bridge No. 11, at 189 feet in length, was the longest bridge within the southern route,
requiring seven support frames. By the time workers reached the Louisiana-Mississippi border,
they had constructed fifteen bridges, totaling almost 1,300 feet in length and the road stretched
less than seventy miles from Madisonville. To complete the Military Road’s southern portion,
workers had to continue the road to the Choctaw boundary line. In all, from Madisonville to the
Choctaw boundary, workers erected twenty-two bridges about 1,835 feet in total length. (See
Figure 4 and Figure 5 for more examples of how the bridges were designed.). In the entire
stretch of the Military Road’s southern portion, the greatest distance workers proceeded without
having to erect a bridge was only sixteen miles.118 In most cases, the distance was less than ten.
Also, along with erecting bridges, workers also had to build causeways. As with the bridges,
workers numbered the causeways based on their position from Madisonville. Causeways, on
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average, were much longer than the bridges and were called for more frequently. In just one mile
from Madisonville, workers built five causeways.

Figure 1. Sketch of Bridge No. 1 at Covington

Figure 2. Sketch of Bridge No. 3 across Black Bayou

Figure 3. Sketch of Bridge No. 9 across Pushepatapa Creek
38

Figure 4. Sketch of Bridge No. 15 across Lees Swamp Creek

Figure 5. Sketch of Bridge No. 30 across Big Bear Creek

was 639 feet long. For materials, workers had to use logs that were one-and-a-half feet in
diameter and twenty-six-feet long. The workers spaced the logs eleven feet apart to create the
causeway’s foundation, which required almost sixty logs. For the next layer, three logs of the
same diameter, but thirty-six feet long were laid perpendicularly across three foundation logs,
forming a grid-like pattern. On top of every third foundation log sat a total of six logs, as the
second layer of timbers were interlocked for greater stability. For the third layer, workers used
timber that was hewn on three sides and notched on the bottom to provide a better connection
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with the second layer. The third and final layer consisted of smaller logs with various widths, so
long as their thickness was relatively the same (Figure 6).119

Figure 6. Sketch of the construction of Causeway No. 1

For Causeway No. 2, workers only used a single layer of timbers placed closely together,
for a length of over 230 feet. Then, the workers dug ditches on both sides of the road, measuring
four-feet-wide and three-feet-deep. The soldiers then took the dirt from the ditches and placed it
atop the causeway to create a smoother surface.
By the time the workers reached Covington, where they needed to build their first bridge,
they had already built thirteen causeways totaling 1,783 feet. Most of the causeways were built
in the same manner as Causeway No. 2, with a few inconsistencies. Causeways No. 5 and No.
24 were only ditched on one side. On Causeway No. 10, which was fifty-feet-long, workers
placed hewn timbers across the entire span to act as flooring, rather than dirt.
By the time workers had reached the Choctaw boundary line, they had built 124
causeways a total of 10,389 feet long. The soldiers built most of the causeways to a height of
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one-foot and six-inches. However, the causeways that required more layers of timber, such as
Causeway No. 1, reached heights of over four feet. At 639 feet, Causeway No. 1 was by far the
longest. The second-longest, Causeway No. 76, was 482 feet long. On average, workers built
the causeways about eighty-four feet in length.120
To build such lengthy structures, many hands were required. At any given time from the
moment construction commenced, hundreds of laborers were employed in cutting both roads. A
monthly return from September 1819 reveals that 341 men were employed in cutting the Military
Road’s southern portion, while almost 150 men were cutting the northern section.121 The
soldiers were of varying rank. A monthly report from July 1818, reveals that, among the men
cutting the southern portion of the road, were one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, five
sergeants, five corporals, sixty-four privates, and three musicians.122 An 1819 report from the
road’s northern section included fifty-three privates, two corporals, and three surgeons. The
report also noted that five men were missing from the role. Four had deserted and one had
died.123
An 1820 report provides a good understanding of the man-hours these workers endured
and their labor cost to the government. Divided into two time periods, the report first examined
the labor hours, between June 1817 and December 1818. During this time, the 1st Infantry
served as the primary labor force. The second time period examined a slightly shorter period,
from December 1818 to January 1820. During this stage, the 8th Infantry made up the majority
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of the labor force. During the first period, the soldiers labored for a total of 37,562 days. During
the second period, their labor totaled 36,407 days.124 Along with the cost of sheer labor and
building materials, the government also had to provide these workers with tents, clothing, and
food.
The further these men pushed the road away from their original termini, the further they
distanced themselves from the necessary supplies needed to build the road and take care of
themselves. A November 1819 invoice provides some detail as to how massive just a simple
order of clothing supplies could be, especially heading into the winter months. First, the invoice
noted that the entire order was placed in twelve large containers. Container one consisted solely
of fifty blankets. Container two consisted of thirty more blankets, 160 pairs of stockings, and ten
flannel shirts. Container three was filled with 150 more flannel shirts. The fourth container held
152 desperately needed pairs of shoes. Container five held seventy-six coats for infantry privates
and twenty-four fatigue frocks. The sixth container held thirty more fatigue frocks seventy-six
grey wool overalls. Packed in container 7 was eighty long-sleeved grey jackets and more fatigue
frocks. Container eight contained sixteen fatigue trousers, four staff sergeant coats, two
musician’s coats, and eight cotton shirts for sergeants. Also for sergeants, the package contained
four white wool overalls and four green wool overalls. For privates, the container also held
seventy-six white wool overalls. The rest of the containers included similar contents, as well as
six pounds of thread, 200 black buttons, eighty pairs of gaiters, eighty caps, and eighty canteens.
The invoice was created in New Orleans, but the materials were destined for the northern section
of Jackson’s Road.125 An estimate of provisions for a company included soap, beef, forty barrels
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of flour, and 330 gallons of whiskey.126 The total cost was estimated at 2,500 dollars. An invoice
for larger items included thirty camp kettles, thirty-six common tents, six wall tents, two wall
tent flyers, and eighty tin pans.127
Yet, too often, adequate supplies did not reach the workers on the Military Road.
Military leaders usually blamed the contractors. However, the difficulties in supplying the
troops rested in one of the Military Road’s great paradoxes. Workers needed to cut the road to
create a reliable distribution network, but without such a road there was no reliable way to
supply the workers.
To send such massive amounts of supplies, the military employed a distribution system
that stretched from New Orleans to the rivers nearest the troops on the Military Road. When
workers were still within Louisiana, supplies would be shipped from New Orleans across Lake
Pontchartrain to Madisonville. From there, supplies could be moved by wagon across the
Military Road. As troops proceeded into the Mississippi Territory, the shipping routes changed.
There was no standard shipping method, as it appears debates on the best methods continued
throughout the entire construction project. One method was for ships to leave New Orleans, sail
into the Gulf of Mexico, and up one of the many rivers that emptied into the Gulf. They would
unload at the camp or fortress nearest the particular river and use wagons to transport the goods
to their final destination on the road. Even troops cutting the northern section of the road were,
at least at times, supplied by this method. An invoice from 1819 reveals that supplies were
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sailed from New Orleans to Mobile’s Fort Charlotte and then to the workers on the Military
Road’s northern section.128
The system of river shipping was also fraught with peril. During dry seasons, the rivers
could become too shallow. However, during wet seasons, the rivers could become too swift.
Isaac Craig, in a report to General Ripley, mentioned the difficulties his party faced in navigating
the Pearl River, as well as other alternatives. The shipment Craig’s party transported originated
in New Orleans and sailed up the Pearl River with a crew of sixteen men. The sloop, laden with
ten large containers, required four weeks just to reach Camp Daingerfeild (Craig’s camp on the
Pearl). At the camp, more soldiers boarded the ship to help with the difficulties that lay ahead.
To boat, now staffed with a crew of nearly seventy men set out to transport their cargo. Craig
found peril in almost every section of the river. Some locations were too narrow. Some were
too deep to use poles. In one part of the river, the current was too swift. Fallen trees obstructed
parts of the river. In one location the obstruction caused by fallen timber caused an entire
quarter-mile section to become unnavigable. Some locations were so shallow that the sloop
became stuck. When this occurred, the sailors had to unload the vessel, shovel out the river bed
to float the ship again, cut away and timber or stumps, and then reload the boat. The sloop was
fifty-feet-long and eight-feet wide. “I had her unloaded repeatedly,” Craig stated, “and even then
it was with the utmost difficulty I succeeded in taking her through, although there was near
seventy men hauling her.” Craig blamed soot deposited by the Spring thaw for the creation of
such shallow spots. Craig lamented, “We seldom moved more than 50 yards before we were
again fastened [stuck], and often times, not more than 10 feet. It was in this manner we were
near two days in going only 14 miles.”
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When Craig’s sloop was unloaded, it drew one foot of water. In his estimation, this was
the maximum acceptable draw, and less would be better. Also, he realized his ship was too long
for the Pearl. At most, a ship could be no longer than thirty-feet-long. Another problem existed
in the multiple streams that branched away from the Pearl. Some narrowed to ten yards.
Captains needed to be sure they maintained the correct course, which could become difficult
during the wet seasons. As far as Craig was concerned, depending solely on the Pearl to supply
troops was “extremely dangerous” and “preposterous, if not impracticable.” 129
The other supply route currently was called ships to leave New Orleans towards
Madisonville. There, the vessels entered the Tchefuncte River and sailed to Covington. The
ships were then unloaded unto wagons and hauled to the Pearl River by land. At the Pearl River,
the wagons were placed on different boats to sail north. Craig believed this route was
“extremely expensive and precarious” as it required supplies for 400 men to travel 70 to 100
miles of new road. 130
Craig devised his own plan, which was also convoluted and slow. Instead of entering the
Pearl River, ships would enter Catahoula Creek, east of the Pearl. Craig stated that “should this
river be navigable,” it would be perfect for boats of six tons or less that drew a maximum of one
foot of water. The boats would travel the river to ferries at Perry’s Mills. From there, the cargo
would be unloaded unto a wagon train and transported approximately fifteen miles to the
navigable portion of the Pearl River. At this location would be waiting a “line of boats of 8 or 10
tons.” These ships would sail a relatively short distance near the troops and once again have
their cargo unloaded unto wagons. As seemingly preposterous as Craig’s plan sounds, it displays
the obstacles suppliers faced in reaching the troops. It is difficult for a plan to appear sound if
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there are no good solutions. Whether in the difficulty of building dozens of causeways and
bridges or in trying to supply the workers, the numerous rivers, streams, swamps, and creeks
persistently eroded the military’s time, budget, and patience.131
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THE OBSTACLES OF MEN

Two years into the Military Road’s construction, General Ripley had not wavered from
his initial estimate of the difficulties of his office. Writing to Jackson, Ripley stated that from
the moment of his arrival the state of the command was “deplorable” and the officers terrible. Of
the officers on hand, he bemoaned, “there are not more and 3 or 4 in it but what I feel proud of.”
For instance, Ripley noted, “Gen. Bissell I believe is really an invalid.” To drive his point
further, he told Jackson, “You may judge the total inefficacy of this command when I state to
you one fact – [This department had] no less than 20 vacancies in two regiments of infantry and
of 40 officers . . . only about 16 had ever been present, the others were either on furlough or
arranged to companies in the Northern Division.” Despite all of these difficulties, Ripley bragged
that in about one year’s time he had advanced the road nearly fifty miles and erected “many
excellent bridges.”132
By November of 1818, Ripley informed Jackson that he was “concentrating corps
together as much as possible” because he believed the organizational plan created by Jackson’s
department too inefficient. Ripley believed there were too many people in charge of different
duties on the road. “I hope you will not think me obtrusive,” he cautioned, “when I state that the
mode to render this labor efficient is to place it all under the control of one person of the
Q[uarter] Masters Department and render him responsible.” He also knew the perfect man for
the job – Lieutenant Samuel Riddle, whom Ripley emphasized was a mechanic. Ripley assured
Jackson that Riddle would “push [the road] faster than any person I know of.”133 Less than four
months later, on March 8, 1819, Ripley reassigned Assistant Adjutant-General Perrin Willis to
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oversee Riddle and to take command of the party working on Ripley’s portion of the Military
Road.134 Work on the road had still been progressing too slowly, and Ripley hoped another
change in command might accelerate the progress. However, prior to his reassignment, Willis
was still completing his monthly returns from the previous year and it would not be long before
his tardiness caught the ire of Jackson’s headquarters. At times, Butler reprimanded Willis for
tardiness, incomplete returns, and reports lacking detail.135 In such cases, Willis rarely lacked an
excuse. However, Willis’s field notes and his letters to his superiors demonstrate his concern for
his troops and provide insight into the Military Road’s troublesome construction.
Problems arose immediately. Willis requested supplies to be sent ahead by way of the
Pearl River – they never arrived.136 Upon reaching camp, Willis expressed pride in the work of
acting-commander Lieutenant Samuel Riddle and frustration towards the contractor for “the
deficiency of almost all other supplies necessary.” 137 Most of the troops he found barefooted –
their naked feet covered in wounds. Of the one-hundred-and-fourteen men now under his
command, only an average of fifty were able to perform labor on a given day. Of the few that
could work, the numerous briars, roots, and wetlands offered painful reminders of their exposed
feet. Willis assured Butler that the difficulties would be “surmounted only with the greatest
difficulty.”138
During the first sixty-days of Willis’s command, his troops constructed a ten-mile section
of the road. In those ten-miles, the soldiers cleared a path thirty-five feet wide – cutting down
every tree and leveling every stump as low as possible. Large streams necessitated the
construction of “two significant bridges” spanning a total of two-hundred and twenty-two feet.
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Causeways were constructed through wetlands with ditches dug out on both sides and dirt piled
in the middle sections of the designed path. Where the road included steep descents, Willis
ordered logs to be buried in the roadway to prevent the dirt from washing away. The logs also
prevented the weight of carriages from causing the road to become unleveled.139
Willis also performed a cost-analysis of his section’s construction. Had the labor been
performed by private citizens, Willis estimated the cost would have been $3,800. The soldiers
stationed on the road, however, only made 15 cents per day more than their standard salary
(along with a quarter-pint of whiskey). Their bonuses’ total cost to the government was less than
four-hundred and sixty dollars. Willis was at once proud of this money-saving tactic and also
aware that the soldiers probably deserved higher wages. He advised their wages be raised to
twenty-dollars per month.140
For the next stretch of the road, Willis fixated on the River. It would have to be ferried
across – but where? Four men (Mr. McLaughlin, Mr. Seale, Mr. Henigan, and General Lee)
each contended their ferry was best suited for Jackson’s Military Road. Willis crossed each ferry
– noting the advantages of each. He also interviewed each ferry owner and found them (notsurprisingly) willing to explain all of the disadvantages of the others’ ferries.141
However, ferries were not Willis’s only concern with the Pearl River. Willis believed the
military was not truly exploiting the River’s potential use in transporting troops and men.
Admitting he was wading past his assigned duties, Willis included an examination of the River’s
benefit.142 Instead of lauding Willis’s initiative, Andrew Jackson penned a direct rebuke.
Willis’s report contained a wealth of information – but not the information headquarters had
139

Perrin Willis to Robert Butler, June 14, 1819, Loc-AJP.
Ibid.
141
Ibid.
142
Willis’s praise of the Pearl River’s potential in commercial navigation was refuted heavily one month later, in
Isaac Craig’s report that was mentioned earlier.
140

49

asked for. The letter rebuked both Willis and his commanding officer, Major-General Ripley,
for working on extra projects while not even completing the ones Jackson had directly ordered.
To the troops’ regretful condition, Jackson concluded there was “thoughtful neglect.” Jackson
also noted that he personally had “explored those rivers and lakes and bays with a view to the
defense of the country” and that their proposed routes would be “more expensive than [his]
direct route . . . between Madisonville and Tombigbee [River.]”143 The frustration Jackson
expressed to Willis and Ripley would be repeated multiple times throughout the rest of the year.
By the end of July 1819, troops on the Military Road’s northern section had already
advanced seventy-five miles south of the Tennessee River.144 The situation on the southern
portion, in contrast, was not as promising. General Ripley, a man Jackson never wanted under
his command to begin with, kept getting distracted by projects Jackson never approved. In
August of 1818, Ripley wrote to Jackson asking for permission to lead a party on the Red River
in modern-day Oklahoma and Texas.145 By October, Ripley informed Jackson that he was
preparing troops and erecting stockades against a possible Spanish invasion from Texas and that
he had asked the Governor of Louisiana to call up the militia.146 Later that month, Ripley
warned Secretary of War Calhoun that he believed Spain had an invasion force of 500 soldiers
ready, which was more men that he currently had on the Louisiana frontier.147 Ripley believed
the Spanish had designs to take back parts of the Louisiana Territory, but Jackson rejected the
idea. To Jackson, to only real threat presented by Spain was in Florida.
The distraction that infuriated Jackson the most, however, was closer to home. Ripley
had ordered an additional road to be built from Bay of St. Louis (Mississippi) to intersect
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Jackson’s military road. However, Jackson had previously ordered all of Ripley’s spare troops to
work on the primary military road. Not only was Ripley’s road causing delays on the Military
Road, but Jackson also believed Ripley’s road was unnecessary. Jackson was convinced that
Ripley’s intersecting road was actually less efficient than using the previously cut trails and river
passageways that already existed. Jackson berated Ripley – if Ripley had put the same attention
into the construction of Jackson’s military road as he had his own, the Military Road would
already be near completion. “That every disposable Soldier would have been engaged in
completing this Road I had a right to expect,” Jackson wrote, “both from my Letters of the 15th
and 27th. of November last as well as from your letter of the 1st of May.” Why Ripley had
diverted resources away from the Military Road was an answer both Jackson and the federal
government demanded.
Furthermore, Ripley’s diversion had created problems with the supply lines. Troops that
should have been stationed along the Military Road were instead working along Ripley’s road,
meaning it took supplies longer to reach them. Jackson had received reports of soldiers without
shoes and low on rations, which was inexcusable considering how close Ripley’s troops were to
New Orleans’ depots. Jackson was also bothered by the lack of detail in Ripley’s reports.
Ripley, despite Jackson’s requests, had not yet sent a report on how many of his troops were
actually being used to construct the Military Road. Jackson ordered Ripley to send a detailed
report that included his management of men and supplies from the beginning of the road’s
construction - as well as better justifications for Ripley’s road. “When you reflect Sir that this
road was commenced in the Summer of 1817 and yet progressed not more than from fifty to
Seventy miles,” Jackson warned, “You must expect the Government will require a satisfactory
report of the cause from which this extraordinary delay has Originated, and for this purpose you
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have been called on repeatedly for special report on the Subject.” Jackson also warned Ripley
that in the report, “the utility of [Ripley’s] road be plainly manifested, as it appears on the 12th
Inst [sic] you ordered an additional force for its completion, in direct violation of my repeated
orders.”148
Jackson’s letter, along with follow-up letters from Ripley’s direct superior, Robert Butler,
served as a final straw for Ripley. On August 20, Ripley resigned from Jackson’s command. It
would take about three months for Ripley’s duties to be completed and for him to actually leave
his post. In his resignation letter, a frustrated Ripley assured Butler that he had sent troops to cut
timber near Madisonville, but there was very little progress that could be made. Ripley defended
his slow progress by blaming the conflicting orders he had received. According to Ripley, the
surveys he received called for construction of different lengths in differing locations. Without
clear instructions, Ripley pondered how he could be the one blamed for the lack of progress.
Plus, Ripley explained, it had consistently rained for twenty days – further delaying his men.
Another issue was a massive storm that had destroyed some of the bridges and causeways
already erected. Ripley believed the storm had set the project back at least two months.
However, the letter also proves that Ripley was not diligent in procuring the information he
needed. Ripley claimed that troops within his own command had given differing reports of the
Military Road’s length, and instead of offering evidence that he demanded greater accuracy,
Ripley simply just presented the conflicting reports as another inconvenience outside of his
control.149 In viewing one of Ripley’s final reports, it is evident that the general had assigned a
large portion of his forces to duties on the Military Road. Not counting the men stationed at
Ripley’s headquarters, he had 1,200 men stationed along his command’s fortresses and camps, as
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well as along the Military Road. Of those 1,200 men, Ripley devoted almost 350 to road
construction – over one-fourth of the total. This number, at least in 1819, was more than double
the 143 men stationed on the northern road.150 Whether or not Ripley positioned enough men on
the road was a point of contention between himself and Jackson. Regardless, it was the slow
progress of the road’s construction that met Jackson’s greatest disapproval.
Butler accepted Ripley’s resignation, ordering him to turn over command to his next-incommand and to settle his debts with the military. The man Jackson never wanted was finally
gone. Secretary of War Calhoun was equally glad to be rid of Ripley, writing to Jackson that
“the disorganized state in which General Ripley left his command is as disrespectful to that
office as it was unexpected to this department. I am glad that your prompt interference has
restored order and discipline and I hope for the welfare of the Army and country such
irregularities may never be repeated.”151
Two reports created shortly after Ripley’s resignation give an idea of the disappointing
progress Ripley made on the Military Road in 1819. The first report came from James Page,
who had traveled the road’s southern portion to draft a report on the progress of the bridges.
Page’s report was solely concerned with the bridges workers had erected since January 1819.
According to Page, eight bridges had been erected between January and August. Unlike other
reports on the bridges, which sometimes included measurements in the inches, Page settled for
estimated the lengths of many bridges, rather than trying to measure the correct distance.
Whether Page simply lacked the instruments for precise measurements or assumed general
figures were acceptable for his report is uncertain. Page, writing just six days after Ripley’s
resignation, stated, “The first bridge erected . . . is from 80 to 90 feet in length by 20 in width.
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The second bridge . . . is from 60 to 40 feet in length and 20 in width. The third . . . is 190 feet in
length, 20 in width. The fourth over a creek near Pearl River is 30 feet in length by 20 in width.
The fifth . . . is 25 or 30 feet in length by 20 in width. The sixth is 80 feet. The seventh bridge is
. . . 150 feet in length by 20 in width. The 8th over a stream in the Pearl River swamp is 35 to 40
feet in length by 20 in width.”152 The bridges, per Jackson’s original orders, were all twenty-feetwide.153 However, Page posited that the labor in creating so many bridges was the primary factor
in the Military Road’s slow progress. In fact, Page estimated that cutting roads where no bridges
were needed was twelve times faster than the time invested in erected bridges. “Taking into
consideration the necessary time employed in building the aforementioned bridges and
estimating the time thus employed, I have no doubt in saying that for each mile where a bridge
was erected that the troops might [have] progressed twelve miles had there been no bridges to
erect.” For example, the largest bridge, he believed, took two months to complete and required
the labor of nearly 100 men. Other bridges, he believed, required a similar amount of time and
labor.154
A second, undated report, demonstrates the length, condition, and construction methods
of nine causeways Ripley superintended. First, of the nine causeways, the widest were 17 feet in
width – not the 20 feet Jackson had ordered. Two were only 13 feet wide. Two causeways were
240 and 245 feet long. Combined, the nine causeways were 935 feet long. One was constructed
of thirty-foot-long, unhewed logs, measuring one foot in diameter and was fastened to numerous
poles using wooden pins. The others were not made of such strong materials. Most consisted of
“small pine poles.” The two longest causeways were already in a dilapidated state. Both were
“nearly all washed away and [their] materials scattered.” One causeway was now only forty152

James Page to Eleazar Wheelock Ripley, August 26, 1819, LoC-AJP.
Andrew Jackson to George Graham, May 13, 1817, PoAJ-Rotunda.
154
James Page to Eleazar Wheelock Ripley, August 26, 1819, LoC-AJP.
153

54

feet-long, because two-thirds of its original 120-foot-length had washed away. Part of the reason
for the failure of these causeways owed to poor construction. The unknown author stated, “In no
case are [the causeways] ditched, nor is there any earth thrown over them, in consequence, they
are of but little real service, as it is with great caution only, that a horse can safely pass them.”155
In September, Ripley sent a final report to Jackson. Ripley again defended his command
and placed blame for the Military Road’s slow progress on outside forces. Ripley stated that he
had ordered Lieutenant Riddle to use 130 men for construction on Jackson’s Road while giving
separate orders to Lieutenant Allen to build Ripley’s road connecting the Bay of St. Louis to the
Pearl River. Ripley said he have the order to Allen “about the 13[th of] January last if I mistake
not.” Without offering an explanation, Ripley then claimed he had to spend the month of
January in town and away from the construction projects. Upon his return, he said he discovered
that Allen was using more troops for his road than Ripley intended. Ripley then claimed he
ordered Allen to only keep twenty-five to thirty men on the project and release the rest for work
on Jackson’s road. As for the lack of shoes and other supplies, Ripley claimed that singular
blame lay at the feet of the contractors, who failed to deliver the supplies he had ordered. He
then stated that he refused to push his men too hard when they lacked such basic necessities.
Furthermore, Ripley claimed he had been ordered to also supply officers in command of troops
in Indian Country and that he was not even aware of any troops in Indian Country. Ripley closed
his letter by stating his relief to get away from this command. “These various combinations of
duty particularly with continual failures on the part of the contractors render the command here
very irksome and I most anxiously desire to get away from it.”156 Ripley and Jackson finally
found common ground – their desire to be rid of one another.
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If Ripley did in fact pull too much labor from Jackson’s Road, the results did not merit a
greater outcome for Ripley’s own roadway. For Ripley’s road, mother nature acted even more
swiftly in thrusting it into obscurity. In a report from February 1820, James Scallan informed
Jackson of the sad state of Ripley’s road. “After every exertion short of the total loss of the
horses I had with me,” Scallan stated, “I could explore but about 30 miles of it which approached
within 18 miles of the Bay of St. Louis – that space is represented by the inhabitants to be
entirely impassable even for footmen; the late hurricane having blocked the road with fallen
timber and the rains and floods consequent to the hurricane having destroyed the bridges and
floated away the causeways.” Scallan believed the original causeways were not built high
enough, as about one-third of the land he travelled was fully submerged. He estimated at least
ten miles of causeway would be necessary to replace the road at a cost of 6,000 total days
labor.157 Ripley’s road had been destroyed just as construction on Jackson’s road was in its final
stage.
In early 1820, work on the Military Road neared completion. During the same time, a
group of white squatters had encroached on Creek lands. It was Andrew Jackson’s job to
remove the squatters. However, he wrote to the Creek leaders that, for the moment, they would
have to deal with the nuisance themselves. It is possible that Jackson simply did not care about
the issue, but his excuse was that he could not spare men from work on his road.158
Also early in 1820, Duncan L. Clinch assumed command of the 8th Regiment of Infantry
and the position of superintendent of the Military Road. He ordered the two men in charge of the
road’s two sections, Colonel Taylor in the South and Captain Humphrey in the North, to file
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reports on the Military Road’s progress. Specifically, Clinch asked for “the distance that has
been opened, . . . the distance they have still to complete, & the probable time it will take to
complete it: as well as the state of resources.” Captain Humphrey reported that his northern
section was basically completed. Col. Taylor reported that his southern section would probably
be completed by May 20, aside from the portions that would need repairs. Those repairs,
however, could be completed on the troops return march to Madisonville.159 The road neared
completion just as the federal government was increasing the pressure to see the expensive road
completed.
Entering a new decade, the American people and the federal government were growing
weary of funding a large, peacetime military. Congress announced its intentions to reduce
military spending and troops numbers.160 On May 16, 1820 Secretary of War Calhoun wrote to
Andrew Jackson. Budget cuts meant further expenditures for the Military Road were unlikely.
He warned Jackson that unless the road were completed soon and with little extra expense, it was
likely the project would be suspended and the troops ordered away.161 However, by the time the
letter reached Jackson’s desk, the threat was outdated because word had also reached Jackson
that the road was finally complete.
On May 17, 1820, Andrew Jackson left his Nashville headquarters to travel along and
inspect the Military Road. In a letter to Calhoun, Jackson wrote, “Having received information
that the Military Road is complete, I have determined to leave this today with a view to examine
it, and to take such further measures for its improvement as seem to be necessary on an
examin[ation] of its present State.” During the inspection, Jackson stated he would link up with
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troops stationed along the road’s northern section and redirect them to areas that needed repair
and improvement.162 Small improvements and repairs aside, Jackson’s road had finally reached
completion. Beginning in Nashville, the road traveled almost directly south until reaching the
Tennessee River near present-day Muscle Shoals, Alabama. After crossing the river, the road
began a nearly-straight-line southwesterly course, crossing the Alabama-Mississippi border near
Columbus, Mississippi (and near the Tombigbee River).163 From there, the line continued its
trajectory until reaching Madisonville, Louisiana, on Lake Pontchartrain. From there, travelers
ferried to New Orleans on the opposite side of the lake. Jackson’s war-time heroics, his
reputation, and his command of the Gulf’s defenses had always kept the general connected to
New Orleans. Now, at least in theory, there was a physical connection linking his headquarters
to the city.
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“THE COURSE OF EVENTS HAS CHANGED ENTIRELY”

On January 1, 1820, General Bissell ordered Lieutenant James Scallan to explore the
Military Road “as far as it has been executed” to report on the road’s progress and costs.164 In a
final report, provided by Scallan, Jackson’s Road consisted of a total of thirty-five bridges that
totaled 3,213 ½ feet long and 392 causeways that totaled 25,185 feet. The total distance of the
road was measured at 483 miles. Over the nearly four years of the road’s construction,
manpower days were totaled at 75,801 days.165 At fifteen-cents-per-day for labor, the federal
government expended $11,370.15 for labor alone. This ignores the salaries of generals, such as
Jackson and Ripley. Also absent from the figure is the total cost of construction supplies, such
as timber, bolts, tar, nails, saws, and shovels. It also does not include the clothing, food, and
whiskey allotted to each soldier.166
Work on the Military Road began in 1816 and was completed in 1820. It had taken many
hours of military labor and the numerous tribulations suffered by the men who surveyed and
built Jackson’s road. Jackson, the defender of New Orleans, had (he thought) created a network
that would continue to defend the city, as well as southern Mississippi and Alabama. Surveyors,
such as William Orlando Butler and Hugh Young, braved the extremes of the frontier wilderness
to design the pathway. Their many uncredited staff members suffered through the same
hardships. Soldiers of the 8th Army Regiment cut trees, cleared roadways, and built bridges and
causeways through flooded swamplands. Congressmen provided funding for the road. Various
Secretaries of War and two Presidents oversaw the project. The completion of Andrew
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Jackson’s Military Road was the culmination of numerous labors. And yet, despite the toils of so
many, the road quickly fell into disrepair and obscurity.
In 1820, the year the road was completed, a report from Florence, Alabama published in
the Nashville Whig ventured that stages would soon dot the road’s path and make it “the most
important [road] of any on the continent.”167 The report was wrong. Historian William A. Love
also falsely believed in the road’s success. Writing in 1910, Love stated, “the [governmental
road] contributing the largest degree to the development of Mississippi as a State was generally
known as General Jackson’s Military Road.” However, Love was operating on assumptions and
did not provide any evidence of the road achieving such success. Perhaps the most easily
disputed of Love’s claims was his belief that the Military Road’s use as a postal route proved
how sturdy and efficient the road was. Love argued, “After the completion of General Jackson’s
road, it, doubtless, received a large share of travel . . . In the absence of any reliable data in this
connection, attention is directed to the Post Office Department as a source of information, for
mail routes are, as a rule, fair indexes to food roads, thickly-settled communities and business
activities.”168 The Post Office, however, felt differently.
In 1819, to give the road more utility, Congress approved the road’s use as a postal road.
However, by 1825, a report from the Post-Master General’s office states that the road was “so
much out of repair, as to render the regular transportation of mail impracticable. The bridges and
causeways have fallen into decay, and, in many parts, the entire space opened for the road has
become filled with young growths of timber.”169 In less than five years after the road’s
completion, much of it had become impassable for mail service – much less to be used for the
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rapid deployment of troops. In 1826, the Post-Master General issued a contract to carry the mail
from Washington, D.C. to New Orleans through the Federal Road by way of Georgia.170
Even before the close of 1820, parts of the Military Road were already showing signs of
disrepair and improper construction. Bridge No. 3, crossing the Black Bayou in Bogue Chitto
Swamp, had been erected with such a steep angle that it proved difficult to move heavy artillery
and heavy wagons up its slope. Bridge No. 1 had already sunk in some places and warped in
others due to the shifting “quicksand” of the riverbed. On one bank, Bridge No. 6 had already
sunk to the high-water level. The same happened at Bridge No. 7.171 The causeways were also
in bad shape. The dirt atop Causeways No. 21 and No. 45 had washed away and exposed the
timbers. No. 29 had degraded, No. 91 was “in bad condition,” and No. 95 was “in bad order”.
Half of Causeway No. 53 had completely washed away.172 Not only was the road physically
being washed away, but it was also disappearing from maps.
On an 1827 map of Monroe County, Jackson’s Military Road is not even denoted.
Monroe county, at the time, included the Military Road’s entrance into Mississippi from
Alabama. On the map, many important towns, rivers, missions, Indian agencies, and roads are
depicted, including the Robinson Road and the Natchez Trace. The absence of any mention of
Jackson’s road serves as further proof of just how unimportant the road had become.173
In examining why the road fell so quickly into disrepair, a few possibilities emerge.
First, tensions between America and Spain had diminished. Since its conception, the primary
logic in the creation of the Military Road was to defend the Gulf Coast against foreign invasion -
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particularly from Britain and Spain. Aside from a direct military assault, the largest threat posed
by Spain’s Florida territory was the land’s use as a haven for runaway slaves and a staging
ground for Indian invasions along its border with the United States. For Americans living within
the frontier lands of Georgia and Alabama, there was a constant fear of Indian invasions from
Spain’s West Florida, as well as the belief that Spain and Britain actively incited these attacks.
Jackson biographer Robert V. Remini stated, “There was no question in Jackson’s mind that the
removal of Spanish and British influence in the area (and British influence was known to exist in
the south) was essential to the final solution of the Indian problem.”174 “Resupplied by Spanish
Authorities,” Jackson warned, “[the Indians] may concentrate, or disperse at will, and keep up a
lasting predatory warfare against the frontiers of the U States.”175 The general pressed his point
further, warning that as long as Spain controlled Florida, the land would “always prove an
asylum to the disaffected and restless savage, as well as to a more dangerous population.”176
Yet, as Jackson’s Military Road neared completion, events transpired in Florida that
would end the Spanish threat. And even on this stage, Andrew Jackson played a pivotal role. As
Jackson biographer Robert V. Remini noted, “In foreign hands the Floridas posed a constant
threat to the peace and safety of the Republic. People living along the southwestern frontier used
to say that whoever owned the Floridas held a pistol at the heart of the United States.”177 Remini
also noted a standard American belief was that “the southern frontier was unsafe as long as the
Spanish occupied Florida and provided a haven for rampaging Indians.” Those “rampaging
Indians” referred to were primarily the Seminole and the Creek who refused to acknowledge the
American land-claims from the Creek War. These Indian nations would launch raids against
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American settlements in Georgia and Alabama and swiftly return to the safety of Spanish
Florida.178 These southern American settlements fell under General Jackson’s military
jurisdiction.
Jackson had first struck against Florida during the War of 1812. Believing his original
marching orders to Natchez were the preemption of an American invasion to take all of Spanish
Florida, the general was greatly disappointed when his army was ordered back to Tennessee
before any hostilities had begun. After achieving victory in the Creek War, but learning of
British activities in Pensacola that threatened the Republic, Jackson wasted no time in finally
invading Spanish Florida. Within the span of two months, Jackson swept through and captured
Pensacola. The U.S. did not try to keep the territory, however. Shortly after his victory,
Jackson’s destiny took him to defend New Orleans and the U.S. government determined it best
to remain on peaceful terms with Spain, whose ally Russia was helping to mediate peace
between America and Britain. 179 Pensacola was returned to Spain and Spanish Florida remained
a thorn in the side of Jackson and settlers along the border.
After the War of 1812, the first significant military action Jackson’s department would
direct against Florida, however, was not solely directed at the British, Spanish, or even the
Indians. Instead, U.S. military might was aimed at a fortress controlled by runaway slaves. The
fortress had been previously constructed by the British to supply their Indian allies and British
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nicholls, who had promised the Indians that Britain would continue
to protect them after the War of 1812, was still stationed there. Because of the influx of runaway
slaves in the post-war era, the fortress had become known as Negro Fort. By 1816, the
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population of runaway slaves numbered nearly 300 and was steadily growing.180 Along with
fears of a slave exodus, the plantation owners must have also felt unnerved by the ever-growing
presence of formerly enslaved persons now armed within a fort. Fears of large slave rebellions
similar to the Haitian revolution had long-haunted white southerners. Mounting on these fears,
Jackson was infuriated that the Spanish had not already acted against the fort. At best, he
thought, the Spanish were too inept to rectify the situation. At worst, perhaps the Spanish
actually supported the fort’s inhabitants. Jackson was certain the British were involved.
Nicholls was still stationed there and the runaway slaves proudly wore red coats.181 Jackson’s
stance on the fort was clear, “If the fort harbours the Negroes of our citizens or friendly Indians
living within our Territory or hold out Inducements to the Slaves of our Citizens to desert from
their owner’s service, this fort must be destroyed.”182 Jackson gave orders to General Edmund
Pendleton Gaines to take any action deemed necessary. Gaines constructed Fort Scott near the
Spanish Florida border and in close striking distance to Negro Fort.183 Naval forces arrived from
New Orleans and, on July 27, 1816, bombarded the fort. Over 270 of the fort’s inhabitants were
killed and over sixty were wounded. With the fort destroyed, the threat of an army of runaway
slaves diminished. Yet, Jackson’s eyes remained on Florida.
The destruction of Negro Fort should be considered a crucial event for many reasons, but
in the scheme of the Jackson Military Road, it could have served as an omen of the shifting
political landscape. The assault on the fort required the United States military to launch an
invasion into foreign territory. A fortress, constructed by the British and still stationed with a
few British subjects, was attacked by the U.S. And the invasion took place in Spanish territory.
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That Jackson and other U.S. leaders felt they could undertake these actions with little to no fear
of retaliatory action from Britain or Spain should have served as a marker of the extent to which
their threat to the southern frontier had already been neutralized.
As commander of the entire Southern District, it was Jackson’s duty to do everything in
his power to create an insurmountable defense network. With the memory of two wars against
Britain so fresh in the minds of military leaders and politicians, it is understandable why the
threat of a third war was taken so seriously. With the advantage of hindsight, however, it easier
to see that neither Spain nor Britain were likely to ever again pose a military challenge to
America’s southern frontier. Had political or military leaders reached this same conclusion, it is
possible (and only a possibility) that construction of Jackson’s Military Road never would have
been seriously considered.
As fate had it, it was the United States (and specifically Jackson) that took the war to
Spanish Florida. In 1818, without a congressional declaration of war or even a direct
presidential order, Jackson launched an invasion deep into Florida to quelch the longtroublesome Seminole attacks against white-settlers. Jackson’s force consisted of 3,000 soldiers
and militia and 2,000 Creek allies.184 The military road that Jackson held so much hope for was
mostly useless in the conflict, as Jackson’s forces traveled far deeper into the Alabama Territory
than that which the road crossed. For the incursion into Florida, once again, new roads had to be
constructed.
One primary road connected Fort Montgomery (modern-day Montgomery, Alabama) to
Hartford, Georgia. Like Jackson’s Military Road, it was constructed by troops. Also, a familiar
promise was given — Gaines stated that this new road would save travelers 100 miles of
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traveling through Creek lands.185 The road appeared necessary, because as with similar
situations across the former Mississippi Territory, the roads were terrible and the supplies
limited. It took Jackson forty-six days to march his troops from Nashville to Fort Scott, which
rested on Georgia’s Flint River, a few miles north of the Florida border.
Once in position, Jackson wanted to ensure this invasion into Florida would be his last.
He pleaded with the federal government to keep the lands, as a matter of national security. “The
Moment the American Army retires from Florida,” he insisted, “The War hatchet will be again
raised, & the same scenes of indiscriminate murder with which our frontier settlers have been
visited, will be repeated.”186 Jackson also warned that, “without the Floridas our lower country
cannot be made secure, and our Navy cannot afford protection to it in time of War.”187 At first,
Congress feigned shock and anger at Jackson’s invasion, going so far as to censure the general.
But by the time the congressmen began their assault on Jackson’s reputation, the general was
already striking decisive blows across Spanish Florida.188 By June, Jackson’s forces had
destroyed many Indian villages, killed many chiefs, and displaced Spanish authorities with a
provisional government. While promising the Spanish inhabitants that the United States had no
intentions of keeping the land, he also began taxing the citizenry.189
In 1819, just one year before the Military Road’s completion, the two nations agreed to
sign what became known as the Adams-Onìs Treaty. In the agreement, Spain ceded its
remaining Florida territory to the United States over the course of three years, and both nations

185

Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads, 122-3.
Andrew Jackson to John Caldwell Calhoun, May 5, 1818, PoAJ-Rotunda.
187
Andrew Jackson to John Caldwell Calhoun, December 21, 1820, PoAJ-Rotunda.
188
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars, 139-40.
189
Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars, 161-2. In a plea that could have extensively changed American
history, Jackson informed President Monroe that, given a frigate and another regiment, he could also conquer Cuba
in a matter of days. Monroe ignored the plea and the matter was dropped.
186

66

agreed on the specific border between the United States and Mexico.190 The treaty also
cemented Spain’s inability to pose a significant military threat to the southern United States and
removed the Florida as a potential staging ground for a British military invasion.
The roles of federal versus state governments also factor into the Military Road’s demise.
For the federal government, it was perfectly acceptable and necessary to build roads through
territories. Once those territories gained statehood, however, road building and road
maintenance were largely left to the states. The most notable exceptions were the building of
roads that connected states to frontier lands. With all of the work Jackson put into his military
road, it may be surprising to some that, as President, he was against using federal funds to
construct and maintain roads within states. When construction began on Jackson’s Military
Road, Mississippi and Alabama were still territorial lands. In territorial lands, such actions were
considered within the realm of the federal government. However, when Congress passed
legislation during his presidency that was designed to repair and lengthen the Cumberland Road,
Jackson vetoed the measure. Then-President Jackson asserted that such action was a state affair
— not federal. The Cumberland Road’s maintenance was then shared between the states of
Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia - just as the responsibility for the sections of
Jackson’s Military Road were eventually left to Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana.191 Tennessee had already achieved statehood in 1796 and Louisiana in 1812. The
majority of the Military Road traversed through the Mississippi Territory. However, in 1817, the
same year that construction began, Mississippi achieved statehood. Alabama had broken from
the Mississippi Territory and later achieved its own statehood in December 1819, just before
construction of the road ended. The statute in the Ohio Statehood Enabling Act, which was
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adopted for all states and required the designation of five percent of public land sales be spent for
road construction and maintenance, went into effect in Mississippi in the year the state was
created on December 10, 1817.192 Thus, by the time the road reached its completion in 1820, the
federal government expected these states to now maintain the roadway. Yet, there existed
further barriers to the road’s maintenance.
Another reason Jackson’s Military Road fell into disrepair was that, despite the labor of
so many U.S. soldiers and financial resources of the federal government, a large portion of the
road still passed through Indian lands. The Choctaws retained control of their Mississippi
Territory until the enforcement of the Indian Removal Act in 1830. Half of the Military Road’s
distance through Mississippi ran through Choctaw Territory (from the Alabama border to central
Mississippi), which likely discouraged white settlers from flocking into the region. Historian
William A. Love, speaking about the Military Road’s condition, stated, “But in the Choctaw
lands, which did not come under state control until 1830, the exact route in some localities has
been obliterated.”193 According to historian John Ray Skates, the Indian cessions tripled the
public land available for settlement in Mississippi. Thus, before 1830, there was a massive
portion of the Military Road that was not open to white settlement. By that time, that section of
the road was in disrepair and the removal of the Indians likely further negated the belief that
large troop movements might be necessary in the region.
Also, just as Mississippi’s geography made the Military Road’s construction so difficult,
it also made parts of the road unnecessary – at least for transferring troops and supplies to the
coast. Many of Mississippi’s rivers, such as the Tombigbee and Pearl, discharge into the Gulf of
Mexico. In most cases it was quicker and more efficient to place troops on boats and sail them
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down these rivers to the coast, rather than march them and their supplies across the Mississippi
terrain. As mentioned previously, during the War of 1812, Andrew Jackson sent his forces to
from Nashville to Natchez by way of the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi Rivers, rather than
march them through the Mississippi wilderness. It was only the calvary, owing to its horses, that
journeyed by land. Even after the Military Road reached completion, military leaders still
believed river passages were more efficient. Duncan L. Clinch, superintendent of the Military
Road in 1820, needed to devise the best method for getting troops from east Mississippi back to
Madisonville. Instead of having the troops march along the road, Clinch advised Jackson to have
the troops march to the Tombigbee River, build flat boats, sail down to the Gulf of Mexico, and
then to New Orleans and Madisonville. Clinch concluded that such a route was “the least
expensive and most convenient mode of transportation.”194 With the southern portion providing
such tremendous difficulty to build and maintain, it made more sense to have soldiers march, at
most, to the Tombigbee River, and sail from there.
In analyzing why the southern portion was even cut if military strategy often dictated the
use of water routes, it is important to remember that the Military Road was primarily constructed
to defend the nation against Britain and Spain. Worry existed that the British or Spanish navies
could capture the Gulf ports and launch in-land invasions. If such a situation were presented, the
Road’s southern portion would have become necessary to launch counter-attacks against the
foreign invaders, or served as an escape route if U.S. forces on the Gulf needed to retreat away
from the coast. The new political realities of the 1820s, the harshness of the Mississippi terrain,
and white settlers’ lack of access to Choctaw and Chickasaw lands would have been enough to
doom Jackson’s Road into obscurity. Yet, a final factor in the road’s failure also exists in the
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bureaucratic inefficiency and personal egos of the government and men who oversaw the road’s
construction.
The road was constructed over the course of two presidential administrations, multiple
sessions of the United States Congress, and the administration of multiple Secretaries of State. It
would be easy to assume that such turnover could lead to different priorities and a different, yet
until 1820 there is no evidence that any part of the federal government waivered in supporting
Jackson’s Military Road. The largest exception to this, at least according to Jackson’s
estimation, was Secretary of State Crawford. As mentioned previously, Jackson believed
Crawford wanted to delay the development of the Mississippi Territory to prevent the citizens of
Georgia from fleeing that state for the new frontier. Plus, it was Crawford that forced the
transfer of Eleazar Ripley to Jackson’s command against Jackson’s protest. However, even if
Jackson was correct that Crawford wanted to stall the development of the Mississippi Territory,
it is still unlikely that travelers from Georgia would have traversed much of the Jackson Military
Road. Most settlers from Georgia and South Carolina came to the Mississippi Territory by way
of the Federal Road.195 General Ripley presents an interesting foil to the success of Jackson’s
Road. He disobeyed or ignored orders directing him to exert more men and time to the road,
instead of having those workers build his alternate road. And while he was assigned to the
division against Jackson’s wishes, it was Jackson who gave him charge over the road’s southern
portion. In fact, Ripley never asked for the position. Upon learning he had been transferred to
Jackson’s position, Ripley wrote to Jackson. In the letter, Ripley stated that he had discussed the
transfer with Secretary of War Crawford and had advised Crawford that he believed he could be
of best use in the Upper Mississippi River region. – the northwest frontier.196 Jackson ordered
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Ripley to the Gulf Coast instead. Whether Jackson thought that was the position that best suited
Ripley or if it was simply a petty act designed to irritate Ripley is not an obtainable certainty
from the documents examined. Regardless, it is apparent that Jackson shares partial blame in
Ripley’s failures along the Military Road’s southern portion. However, there was certainly
plenty of blame to go around and both men relished in passing that blame down the chain of
command. Jackson blamed Ripley for disobeying orders and straying from his primary tasks.
Ripley blamed bad contractors and his subordinates, such as Lieutenant Allen who took too
many laborers off of Jackson’s Road. Neither seemed too willing to place much blame on
themselves.
Bureaucratically, it is possible Jackson was simply given too many responsibilities.
Commanding the entirety of the South and the Northwest frontier, Jackson was tasked with
erecting and maintaining forts along the Gulf of Mexico and the southern Atlantic coast,
protecting Indian lands from white settlers and white settlers from Indian attacks, protecting
trade on the Mississippi River, and protecting all of America’s borders with Spain and a portion
of her borders with Canada.197 During the time, he led multiple invasions against Spanish
Florida and oversaw numerous military actions against Indians. This simple list ignores the
more mundane portions of Jackson’s job, such as paperwork, recruiting, discipline, and lobbying
government officials. With such a vast territory to defend, it is simple to reason that, at times,
the Military Road and other duties were not given as much direct attention from Jackson as he
probably would have preferred. Regardless, Jackson’s mound of duties and his personal rivalries
were still not as significant to the Military Road’s failure as was the bad terrain, the large
expanse of land still controlled by the Choctaw and the Chickasaw, and the federal government’s
changing political focus in the early 1820s.
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In 1817, General Ripely noted to Secretary of War Calhoun that the defensive
infrastructure in the southern frontier was completely outdated. The fortress system in place had
mostly been designed during the 18th century and needed updating to meet the requirements of
future wars. Proposing a new fortress system and praising the Military Road as a key component
to this system, Ripley stated, “The course of events has changed entirely the relation of
things.”198 Yet, by the time the Military Road reached completion in 1820, the course of events
had changed America’s defensive situation once again. Entering a new decade, the threats of the
past had faded further into obscurity and, with them, so did the Military Road.
Despite the Military Road’s rapid decline, parts of the road still exist. Particularly from
Tennessee to Columbus, Mississippi (solely within the northern portion of the road) and from
Covington, Louisiana to the Pearl River (the extreme southern section of the road), parts of the
old road have been paved and are still in use — going by various names, “Military Road,” “Old
Jackson Road,” and “Jackson Road” to list a few. These intermittent portions serve as still
reminders of a road less traveled (though not purposely).
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